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text, and the unwritten doctrines of state sovereign immunity, as one and the same—
reading broad principles into its precise words, or treating the written Amendment as 
merely illustrative of unwritten doctrines. The result is a bewildering forest of case 
law, which takes neither the words nor the doctrines seriously. 
The truth is simpler: the Eleventh Amendment means what it says. It strips the 
federal government of judicial power over suits against states, in law or equity, brought 
by diverse plaintiffs. It denies subject-matter jurisdiction in all such cases, to federal 
claims as well as state ones, and in only such cases. It can’t be waived. It can’t be 
abrogated. It applies on appeal. It means what it says. Likewise, the Amendment does 
not mean what it does not say: it neither abridges nor enlarges other, similar rules of 
sovereign immunity, derived from the common law and the law of nations, that limit 
the federal courts’ personal jurisdiction over unconsenting states. 
Current case law runs roughshod over these distinctions, exposing sound doctrines 
to needless criticism and sometimes leading the Court o! track. Understanding the 
Amendment’s text lets us correct these errors and respect the unwritten law the 
Amendment left in place. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The competition is tough, but the Eleventh Amendment still might be 
the most misunderstood amendment to the Constitution. Adopted in "*$), 
the Amendment provides: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.1 
Ever since, the Amendment’s friends and enemies have competed with 
each other to misconstrue it. Despite their differences, they’ve often made the 
same mistake: treating the written text of the Amendment, and the unwritten 
doctrines of state sovereign immunity, as one and the same. The result is a 
bewildering forest of case law, which takes neither the words nor the doctrines 
seriously. This Article tries to mark a more straightforward path. 
Past understandings have usually gone wrong in one of two ways. The 
+rst is to treat the entire doctrine of state sovereign immunity as somehow 
inscribed within the Eleventh Amendment’s words. Some make this mistake 
by adopting a broad view of immunity, and by reading the Amendment for 
more than it’s worth. Though the text refers only to plainti,s from “another 
State” or a “Foreign State,” this broad theory concludes that a penumbral 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity” extends even to in-state suits.2 Others, 
who take a narrower view of sovereign immunity, have read the Amendment 
for less than it’s worth. What might be called a “compromise theory” of the 
Amendment holds that its enactors, having named a precise set of cases in the 
text, deprived the states of any other immunity in any other federal cases.3 
And under the “diversity theory,” which is narrower still, there is no immunity 
 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
2 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, %&' U.S. ('%, ('), (%& (*#)+); Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, %!+ U.S. )#, **& (*#)%) (holding that a suit by a Pennsylvania citizen 
against an arm of the state “contravenes the Eleventh Amendment”); cf. William P. Marshall, 
Commentary, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, *"( HARV. L. 
REV. *'&(, *')# (*#)#) (arguing that both Hans v. Louisiana, *'% U.S. * (*)#"), and its critics 
“ultimately rest on non-textual assumptions”). 
3 See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Essay, Text as Truce: A Peace Proposal for the Supreme Court’s Costly 
War over the Eleventh Amendment, &% FORDHAM L. REV. (+**, (+(&-'# ((""!); John F. Manning, 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, **' YALE L.J. *!!', *&((-(+ 
((""%); Lawrence C. Marshall, Commentary, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, *"( 
HARV. L. REV. *'%(, *'+!-&* (*#)#); cf. Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments, +! U. CHI. L. REV. !*, !! (*#)#) (taking this position with respect to the Eleventh 
Amendment but suggesting that there may be Tenth Amendment immunities as well). 
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even for some cases falling within the Amendment’s text, if they also fall 
within some other head of federal jurisdiction.4 
A second wrong turn treats the Amendment as merely illustrative of 
sovereign-immunity doctrines writ large.5 For example, common-law 
sovereign immunity can be waived by the sovereign, and maybe it can also be 
abrogated by certain federal statutes.6 Modern interpreters have mistakenly 
inferred that the Eleventh Amendment can be waived or abrogated too.7 
Likewise, common-law sovereign immunity lets a state consent to suit in its 
own courts, sometimes exposing it to Supreme Court review on appeal.8 But 
the Court has mistakenly concluded that its appellate jurisdiction is generally 
exempt from the Amendment’s terms.9 
The truth is simpler. The Eleventh Amendment means what it says. It 
eliminates federal judicial power over one set of cases: suits +led against 
states, in law or equity, by diverse plainti,s. It strips subject-matter 
jurisdiction in all such cases, regardless of why or how the plainti,s are in 
 
4 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, +*& U.S. %%, *"#-*!, *+' (*##!) (Souter, J., dissenting); see, 
e.g., Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., %)' U.S. %!), +"#-*" (*#)&) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Atascadero, %&' U.S. at (+# (Brennan, J., dissenting); Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 
#$, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, +! U. CHI. L. REV. %%', %#"-#) (*#)#) 
[hereinafter Amar, Marbury]; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, #! YALE L.J. *%(+, 
*%&%-&+ (*#)&) [hereinafter Amar, Sovereignty]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the 
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, !# U. CHI. L. REV. %(#, %%' ((""(); William A. Fletcher, The 
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, +! U. CHI. L. REV. *(!*, *(!'-!% 
(*#)#) [hereinafter Fletcher, Reply]; William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an A%rmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition 
Against Jurisdiction, '+ STAN. L. REV. *"'', *"'+ (*#)') [hereinafter Fletcher, Interpretation]; John J. 
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, )' COLUM. L. 
REV. *))#, *)#'-#% (*#)'); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State 
Sovereign Immunity, #) YALE L.J. *, %+ (*#))); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State 
Sovereign Immunity, *##! SUP. CT. REV. *, *"-*'; James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An 
‘Explanatory’ Account of the Eleventh Amendment, )' CORNELL L. REV. *(!#, *(&#-)" (*##)); Edward 
A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, 
and “Federal Courts,” )* N.C. L. REV. *#(&, *#%' ((""'); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Exhuming the “Diversity 
Explanation” of the Eleventh Amendment, !+ ALA. L. REV. %+&, %+# (("*'). 
5 See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, *%" S.	Ct. ##%, *""" (("(") (reading the Amendment “‘not so much 
for what it says’ as for the broader ‘presupposition of our constitutional structure which it con$rms’” 
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, +"* U.S. &&+, &&# (*##*))). 
6 See Curran v. Arkansas, +! U.S. (*+ How.) '"%, '"# (*)+') (consent); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, %(& 
U.S. %%+, %+! (*#&!) (abrogation). 
7 See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., +'+ U.S. !*', !*) ((""() 
(contending that a state is “free to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity”); Fitzpatrick, %(& U.S. 
at %+! (describing “the Eleventh Amendment” as “necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions 
of §	+ of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
8 See, e.g., Curran, +! U.S. at '"#. 
9 S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, +(! U.S. *!", *!! (*###); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of 
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, %#! U.S. *), '* (*##"). 
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federal court, and in only such cases. It can’t be waived. It can’t be abrogated. 
It applies in the Supreme Court. It means what it says. 
By the same token, the Eleventh Amendment does not mean what it does 
not say. The Amendment doesn’t implicitly repeal any other, similar rules of 
sovereign immunity—including any limits on the federal courts’ personal 
jurisdiction, properly derived from the common law and the law of nations. 
The general law of sovereign immunity existed before the Constitution; it 
remained mostly intact after the Constitution; and it survived the Eleventh 
Amendment, too. 
Despite this confusion, the Supreme Court has arrived at mostly right 
answers in its sovereign immunity cases, most of the time.10 But many of 
those right answers were wrongly defended, with the Court carelessly 
mushing the written and unwritten rules into a formless “hybrid” theory.11 
This carelessness exposed sound doctrines to needless criticism, and 
occasionally it caused the Court to veer o, track. Distinguishing the 
unwritten rules of sovereign immunity from the written rules of the Eleventh 
Amendment lets us deal with each set of rules on its own terms, and lets us 
respect the text as meaning what it says.12 
In this piece we try to set things right, by putting the Eleventh 
Amendment in its historical context. As understood when enacted, the 
Amendment’s words made sense in light of the common-law principles that 
preceded them. In so arguing, we draw on insights from previous 
scholarship,13 together with previously overlooked aspects of the historical 
materials—both of which we believe haven’t yet been properly assembled, and 




10 See William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, *"' VA. L. REV. *, ' (("*&); 
Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, )" GEO. WASH. L. REV. *)*', *)!)-&+ (("*(); Brief of 
Professors William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at *(-
*+, Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, *'# S.	Ct. *%)+ (("*#) (No. *&-*(##) [hereinafter Hyatt Brief]. 
11 Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, +(% U.S. ')*, '#% (*##)) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also 
Emps. of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, %** U.S. (&#, '*"-
** (*#&') (Brennan, J., dissenting); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal 
Jurisdiction, **+ HARV. L. REV. *++#, *!"#-** ((""() (describing the “hybrid nature” of the Court’s 
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence). 
12 Compare, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Part One, *(! U. PA. L. REV. +*+, +*! (*#&)) (arguing that the Amendment does not “mean 
what it says”), with Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, *(' 
HARV. L. REV. *)*&, *)*# (("*") (suggesting that it does). 
13 See generally Nelson, supra note **. See, e.g., Clark, supra note *(; Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the 
Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, +" WM. 
& MARY L. REV. *+&& ((""#); Steven Menashi, Article III as a Constitutional Compromise: Modern 
Textualism and State Sovereign Immunity, )% NOTRE DAME L. REV. **'+ ((""#). 
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• States are protected by two forms of sovereign immunity. 
• The first is a common-law immunity from compulsory process, one that 
prevents states from being forced into court without their consent. 
This immunity existed before the Constitution; it wasn’t eliminated 
by Article III; and it largely can’t be abrogated by Congress under 
Article I. Its limits derive from the common law itself. 
• The second is the Eleventh Amendment. The Amendment supplements 
the traditional immunity, limiting the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts when certain kinds of plaintiffs sue a state in law or 
equity. Its limits apply across-the-board, whatever the head of federal 
jurisdiction. They can’t be waived. They can’t be abrogated. They apply 
to the Supreme Court. They protect states, and states alone. 
I. “POSTULATES WHICH LIMIT AND CONTROL” 
Sovereign immunity has a troubled relationship with text. Recall the 
con+dent declaration of Monaco v. Mississippi: “Behind the words of the 
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”14 This claim 
has come in for some ribbing,15 and for good reason: when the text is clear, 
background “postulates” are the last refuge of scoundrels. 
So Monaco’s claims are easy to dismiss—too easy. Read carefully, they 
re-ect anything but indi,erence to text. On the contrary, they recognize the 
need to read enactments for what they actually say, in light of their unwritten 
antecedents, and with an eye to the preexisting corpus juris.16 If anything, 
ignoring the “postulates” behind the Eleventh Amendment is what’s gotten 
our textual analysis into trouble. 
A. Beyond “Eleventh Amendment Immunity” 
The usual story of the Eleventh Amendment is well-known. In "*$(, the 
Court in Chisholm v. Georgia let a South Carolina citizen use its original 
 
14 (#( U.S. '*', '(( (*#'%). 
15 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, +*& U.S. %%, **! n.*' (*##!) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that such reasoning “stray[s] beyond the boundaries of traditional constitutional analysis”); 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity ‘Exception’, **" HARV. L. REV. *"(, *(* 
(*##!) (arguing that “the power of symbolism” swayed the Court to “reject[] clear constitutional text 
in preference to unarticulated and debatable historical explanations”); cf. Brannon P. Denning & 
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Essay, Comfortably Penumbral, && B.U. L. REV. *")#, **"* (*##&) 
(“penumbral reasoning”); Robert Post, Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review, )! 
CALIF. L. REV. %(#, %%" (*##)) (“lively constitutional adjudication”); Ernest A. Young, Alden v. 
Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, %* WM. & MARY L. REV. *!"*, *!*# ((""") (“amorphous”). 
16 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, *'" HARV. L. REV. *"&#, 
*"## (("*&) (“The Constitution was a legal document, adopted in a world with legal rules of 
interpretation already in place, and those unwritten rules may well have shaped its legal content.”). 
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jurisdiction to sue the State of Georgia for debt.17 The ensuing “shock of 
surprise”18 prompted Congress to propose, and the states to ratify, the 
Eleventh Amendment. That Amendment reversed Chisholm, forbidding suits 
“against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State.”19 In time, the Court came to read the 
Amendment as “con+rm[ing]” a broader “presupposition of our constitutional 
structure,”20 and to apply its terms to a much broader range of circumstances: 
suits by citizens of the same state,21 suits by other unenumerated plainti,s,22 
suits in admiralty (and not just “law or equity”),23 and so on. Through a sort 
of synecdoche, all questions of state sovereign immunity have now come to 
touch on the Eleventh Amendment; the phrase “Eleventh Amendment 
immunity” thus serves as appropriate shorthand for state sovereign immunity 
in general.24 
So goes the usual story. But at the risk of stating the obvious, it isn’t a true 
story, at least where the Constitution is concerned. Neither the Eleventh 
Amendment nor any “Eleventh Amendment immunity” extends to suits not 
described in the Amendment’s text. Reading the words “another State” as if 
they included “the same State,” or the phrase “law or equity” as if it included 
“admiralty,” and so on, is the most risible kind of purposivism—and would 
indeed be funny, if it weren’t sometimes done seriously. 
But. The Court has generally been right to hold the states immune to suits 
by in-state citizens, suits in personam in admiralty, and the like. It’s merely 
that this immunity has nothing to do with the Eleventh Amendment. 
Long before the Eleventh Amendment was rati+ed, indeed even before 
the Constitution was written, the states were protected by doctrines of 
sovereign immunity. These doctrines were drawn from the law of nations and 
 
17 ( U.S. (( Dall.) %*#, %(" (*&#'). 
18 Hans v. Louisiana, *'% U.S. *, ** (*)#"). Compare Seminole Tribe, +*& U.S. at !# (quoting 
Monaco, (#( U.S. at '(+), with id. at *"! n.+ (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he contentions in some of 
our earlier opinions that Chisholm created a great ‘shock of surprise’ misread the history.”). 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
20 Allen v. Cooper, *%" S.	Ct. ##%, *""" (("(") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
21 Hans, *'% U.S. at *. 
22 Monaco, (#( U.S. at ''"-'( (foreign principality); Smith v. Reeves, *&) U.S. %'!, %%"-%* (*#"") 
(federally chartered railroad). 
23 In re New York, (+! U.S. %#", %#&, +"" (*#(*). 
24 E.g., Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals, +!! U.S. '", %' (("*() (plurality opinion) (describing 
Maryland’s “Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits”); Pense v. Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & 
Corr. Servs., #(! F.'d #&, *""-"( (%th Cir. ("*#) (referring to state sovereign immunity as “Eleventh 
Amendment immunity”); cf. Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., #(& F.'d '#!, 
%*' n.& (!th Cir. ("*#) (“State sovereign immunity is sometimes called ‘Eleventh Amendment’ 
immunity because that amendment rea,rmed the doctrine after it was thrown into doubt; however, 
this immunity emanates from our overall constitutional framework rather than existing in any one 
amendment.”). 
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from the common law of which it was a part, and they exempted an 
unconsenting sovereign from what we today call a court’s personal 
jurisdiction.25 (We sometimes give these unwritten doctrines the label of 
“common law,” but “general law” might be more precise:26 this law was often 
shared by multiple jurisdictions, and it included rules of equity or admiralty 
more properly excluded from the “common law” label.) 
As Caleb Nelson has persuasively shown, under these doctrines a sovereign 
state wasn’t amenable to suit and couldn’t be haled into court as a defendant.27 
Pennsylvania’s attorney general explained in "*&" that “every kind of process, 
issued against a sovereign, is a violation of the laws of nations; and is in itself 
null and void.”28 While these doctrines were only rarely codified in statute or 
constitutional text, that was no cause for surprise: the states were already 
accustomed to applying a general law of personal jurisdiction.29 
As is argued in more detail elsewhere,30 there’s very good reason to think 
the Constitution left these general doctrines alone. Article III expressly 
extended the federal judicial power “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority”—and, even more pointedly, 
to controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State,” or “between 
a State	.	.	.	and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”31 One could read these 
 
25 Nelson, supra note **, at *+&%-&#; see also Nathan v. Virginia, * U.S. (* Dall.) && n., &) n. (Pa. 
C.P. Phila. Cnty. *&)*) (applying the international law of immunity); cf. % WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *!& (describing the law of nations as part of the common law). 
26 See William A. Fletcher, General Common Law and Section $& of the Judiciary Act of #'(): The 
Example of Marine Insurance, #& HARV. L. REV. *+*', *+*&-(* (*#)%); Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of 
General Law, *"! COLUM. L. REV. +"', +"+-"& ((""!). 
27 See generally Nelson, supra note **. 
28 Nathan, * U.S. at &) n. (argument of counsel); see also ' THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 
CONGRESSIONAL SERIES *)& n.( (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., *#!') 
(describing a *&)* message regarding Nathan from Pennsylvania’s attorney general, chief justice, and 
one associate justice, stating that “all process directed against the person of a Sovereign or against 
his Goods is absolutely void; that the Sheri- cannot be compelled to serve or return it: and that all 
concerned in issuing or serving such process are guilty of a violation of the laws of nations,” and 
could be committed “to Gaol to answer for the o-ence”). 
29 See, e.g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, * Kirby **#, *(+-(! (Conn. Super. Ct. *&)!) (rejecting a 
Massachusetts judgment, though “conformable to the laws and customs of the said commonwealth 
of Massachusetts,” because that court “had no legal jurisdiction of the cause”); Jenkins v. Putnam, * 
S.C.L. (* Bay) ), *" (*&)%) (stating that “the law of nations” required respecting foreign judgments, 
but only if they were issued by “a court of competent jurisdiction,” for otherwise “the whole 
circumstances of the case would have been open for a full investigation, agreeable to the principles 
of the common law”); cf. Rose v. Himely, ) U.S. (% Cranch) (%*, (&!-&& (*)")) (noting that a foreign 
court’s judgments “are not regarded” by other courts “if it exercises a jurisdiction which, according 
to the law of nations, its sovereign could not confer”). 
30 See Baude, supra note *", at %-*(; Nelson, supra note **, at *+)"-*!"*; Clark, supra note *(, at 
*)!'-&+; Lash, supra note *', at *+##-*!"', *!*)-(&, *!%*-+", *!+'-&!; Menashi, supra note *', at **++-&+. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *. 
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categories of subject-matter jurisdiction as abrogating the states’ personal 
immunities, the way the provision for “Controversies between two or more 
States” presupposed that states could be sued against their will.32 Indeed, 
some people did read Article III that way.33 But when the issue came up 
during Rati+cation, most of the Constitution’s defenders took the opposite 
view—including folks like Alexander Hamilton in New York,34 James 
Madison and John Marshall in Virginia,35 and Rufus King in Massachusetts.36 
They contended that the background principles of immunity remained in 
force, and that Article III had to be understood in their light.37 As Madison 
pointed out, Article III’s citizen-diversity clauses hadn’t erased the disabilities 
of alien enemies or married women to sue and be sued; neither had the state-
diversity clauses erased the states’ immunity to judicial process.38 
It was natural for Madison’s audience to expect the new courts of the 
United States, hearing cases “in Law and Equity” or “of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction,”39 to continue to apply principles of general law that 
courts of law, equity, or admiralty had traditionally applied.40 (Such principles 
were also needed to explain the sovereign immunity of the United States 
itself—which is less controversial, but no less unwritten.) In any case, in the 
view of the majority of Founding-era commentators, as well as most Supreme 
Court decisions of the past "(# years, the Constitution’s defenders had the 
better of the argument.41 
 
32 Id.; see Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, '& U.S. (*( Pet.) !+&, &(" (*)')) (holding that, under 
this clause, “[t]he states waived their exemption from judicial power”). 
33 See, e.g., Brutus, XIII, N.Y.J., Feb. (*, *&)), reprinted in *! THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION *&(, *&( (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., *##') [hereinafter DHRC]; Debates of the Virginia Convention (June *#, *&))), in *" 
DHRC, supra, at *')&, *%"! (statement of George Mason); see also, e.g., Debates of the Virginia 
Convention (June (*, *&))), in *" DHRC, supra, at *%%*, *%+'-+! (statement of Edmund Randolph) 
(arguing that Article III abrogated sovereign immunity and was right to do so). 
34 See THE FEDERALIST NO. )*, at %)& (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., *#!*). 
35 See Debates of the Virginia Convention (June (", *&))), in *" DHRC, supra note '', at *%*(, *%*%, *%''. 
36 See Marcus, MASS. MERCURY (Salem, Mass.), July *', *&#', reprinted in + DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, *&)#–*)"", at ')#, ')#-#" 
(Maeva Marcus ed., *##%) [hereinafter DHSC] (noting that the Massachusetts convention assented 
to Article III on King’s guarantee that state sovereign immunity would not be infringed); Brutus, 
INDEP. CHRON. (Bos.), July *), *&#', reprinted in + DHSC, supra, at '#(, '#(; Democrat, Mass. 
Mercury (Bos.), July (', *&#', reprinted in + DHSC, supra, at '#'-#%, '#+ nn.'-%. 
37 Nelson, supra note **, at *+)"-#(. 
38 Debates of the Virginia Convention, supra note '+, at *%*%. 
39 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *. 
40 See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, *'' U. PA. L. REV. *('*, *(+%-
*'"" (*#)+) (describing the Founding-era role of general law). 
41 See Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, Suits Against States: Diversity of Opinion in the #')"s, 
*##' J. SUP. CT. HIST. &', &', )% (describing the “relatively small but vocal group of pro-Chisholm 
commentators,” and indicating that this group was “in the minority”); Nelson, supra note **, at *+!% 
(“The Court never tires of reminding its critics that during the rati$cation debates, prominent 
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B. The “Postulates” and the Amendment 
Nonetheless, four Justices in Chisholm ruled against the common-law 
immunity, allowing a number of pending suits against states to proceed. The 
Eleventh Amendment was surely written to change the result in Chisholm and 
in these other suits.42 In so doing, however, the Amendment neither codi+ed 
nor repealed the preexisting law of sovereign immunity. 
This followed from two basic features of our legal system. The +rst is that 
we have several kinds of law that layer on top of one another. An ordinary 
debt case might be governed by unwritten common law, state legislation, a 
state constitution, a federal treaty, federal legislation, the federal 
Constitution, or some combination of these. When one kind of law con-icts 
with another, the “superior” law naturally governs, as in Marbury v. Madison.43 
But when the superior law fails to speak to a particular question, that question 
is answered by some other type of law, lower down.44 
The second feature is that, while any of these laws can be changed, we 
have a general presumption against implied repeal.45 Whenever a legislature 
enacts a new statute, it changes certain rules, but it leaves most of the law 
alone. This presumption frees up lawmakers to codify a +eld one provision at 
a time—and it lets them solve today’s problems as they arise, without having 
to reinvent all of yesterday’s solutions. 
So too with a constitutional amendment. When the Eleventh Amendment 
was adopted, it made new constitutional law, altering some of the rules about 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction over suits against states. But the 
Amendment did nothing to repeal or alter the preexisting, lower-down, 
personal-jurisdictional rules of state sovereign immunity that Chisholm had 
failed to apply. Contra Chisholm, these “backdrop” rules simply continued to 
govern, unless and until some other source of law interrupted them.46 
This “backdrop” may seem strange to those who see common-law rules as 
resembling administrative agency regulations. On that view, the Amendment’s 
precise words might have “occupied the field”;47 the courts had lost their 
 
supporters of the proposed Constitution—including both James Madison and John Marshall—
explicitly asserted that Article III would not expose unconsenting states to suit by individuals.”). 
42 See generally Lash, supra note *' (emphasizing the importance of suits other than Chisholm). 
43 + U.S. (* Cranch) *'&, *&) (*)"'). 
44 See Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, #+ TEX. L. REV. *(%#, *(!& (("*&) (describing 
how di-erent legal issues might “fall[] through the holes of one type of law to be answered by 
another—and sometimes slipping all the way through, falling outside the laws of any one state to be 
caught at the bottom by general law”). 
45 Baude & Sachs, supra note *!, at ***", ***)-(". 
46 See Sachs, supra note *", at *)&( (“Chisholm was wrong because Article III really left the 
states’ preexisting immunity in force.”). 
47 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., *'+ S. Ct. *+#*, *+#% (("*+) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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“authority	.	.	.	to craft additional law on the same question,” like agencies 
foreclosed from regulating pollutants that Congress had already addressed.48 
But the Eleventh Amendment’s adopters saw the preexisting rules of sovereign 
immunity as law, not as a vague delegation to the courts to go make law.49 The 
constitutional choice to create one type of protection for states neither erased, 
nor would have been understood to erase, other types of protections. 
So our system is left with two distinct principles of state sovereign 
immunity. One is the common-law principle against forcing states into 
court—neither created by the Constitution, nor abolished by Article III, nor 
supplanted by the Eleventh Amendment. The other is the Eleventh 
Amendment itself, which bars federal jurisdiction over particular suits by 
particular plainti,s. If the Amendment applies, it governs; if not, the general 
immunity governs instead. So principles of sovereign immunity do indeed 
protect states from many suits by their own citizens, or in their own courts, 
or in admiralty cases, or the like. But we shouldn’t call those principles 
“Eleventh Amendment immunity,” presuppositions of our constitutional 
structure, and so on. They come from a common-law immunity that predates 
and outlasts the Eleventh Amendment itself. 
And though Supreme Court decisions like Hans v. Louisiana50 wouldn’t 
win any prizes for draftsmanship, on a careful reading they may have 
understood this distinction. After its references to the Eleventh Amendment, 
Hans went on to note the prerati+cation arguments made by Hamilton, 
Madison, and Marshall (calling them “most sensible and just”);51 to argue that 
“the suability of a State without its consent was a thing unknown to the 
law”;52 and to speak of a “presumption that no anomalous and unheard-of 
proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the Constitution.”53 In 
other words, Hans can be read as an Article III case, rather than an Eleventh 
Amendment case. 
The subsequent decision in Monaco v. Mississippi54 was even more careful 
to distinguish the Amendment’s text from the unwritten law. The Court 
acknowledged that the Amendment “contains no reference to a suit brought 
by a foreign State”; it then explained why this fact was “inconclusive,” for the 
same thing might be said about federal sovereign immunity.55 Article III 
 
48 Manning, supra note ', at *!!#, *&'+ n.()*. 
49 See supra Section I.A. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, *"& CALIF. L. REV. +(& 
(("*#) (defending such views of unwritten law). 
50 *'% U.S. * (*)#"). 
51 Id. at *'-*%. 
52 Id. at *!. 
53 Id. at *). 
54 (#( U.S. '*' (*#'%). 
55 Id. at '(*. 
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extends the judicial power “to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party,” and “there is no express provision that the United States may not 
be sued.”56 Yet the federal government is universally seen as protected by “the 
established doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from suit except upon 
consent.”57 The same reasoning, argued the Court, had to apply to the states: 
“Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of §	' 
of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts 
the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words 
of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.”58 
To identify these postulates, the Court relied in part on contemporary 
statements of the law of jurisdiction—for example, Madison’s understanding 
that a foreign state couldn’t sue “an American state	.	.	.	without the consent 
of the parties,” or Marshall’s questioning whether a foreign-state defendant 
would “be bound by the decision” otherwise.59 In other words, whether or not 
Monaco was rightly decided, the form of its reasoning appears to be correct. 
The relevant postulates included the law of nations and the general doctrines 
of sovereign immunity, which predated Article III and the Eleventh 
Amendment, and which continue to lie behind them even now. Indeed, the 
loose reasoning of which Hans and Monaco are accused may actually be that 
of the Burger Court.60 
C. The “Postulates” and the Modern Court 
Much of the time, the modern Supreme Court’s confusion between the 
constitutional law of the Eleventh Amendment and the general law of 
sovereign immunity is harmless error: the opinion gets to the right place in 
the end. But not always. 
Consider the Court’s recent decision in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.61 The 
Court took the case to decide, for the third time, whether a state’s sovereign 
immunity must be recognized in the courts of another state. The Court 
answered “yes,” overturning prior precedent from "$*$.62 But it con-ated 
di,erent aspects of the two immunity doctrines along the way, ignoring 
important aspects of the Eleventh Amendment’s text. 
 
56 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at '((. 
59 Id. at '('-(% (citations omitted). 
60 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, %&' U.S. ('%, ('), (%& (*#)+) (conflating the doctrine 
and the text); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, %!+ U.S. )#, *"' n.*( (*#)%) (same). 
61 *'# S.	Ct. *%)+ (("*#). 
62 Id. at *%#" (overruling Nevada v. Hall, %%" U.S. %*" (*#&#)). 
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What was con#ated. Most of the modern Court’s sovereign immunity cases 
involved the federal government’s power to hold states to answer. Some cases, 
such as Hans and Monaco, asked whether Article III eliminated a preexisting 
immunity. Others, such as Seminole Tribe v. Florida63 and Alden v. Maine,64 
asked whether Congress could abrogate whatever immunity had remained. 
For the most part, in these cases, the Court said no. 
This answer still makes sense even after one realizes that these cases 
involved the common-law immunity, not the Eleventh Amendment. The 
general law of immunity is in theory abrogable by statute, just like any other 
rule of common law or equity; but it’s also a topic over which the federal 
government has quite limited power. Article III left the immunity in place, 
and a congressional power to force states into court may have been a “great 
substantive and independent” power—the kind that would have been 
mentioned explicitly, and not left out as “incidental to those 
powers	.	.	.	expressly given” in Article I.65 (Congress can abrogate 
international law, but not necessarily to the states’ disadvantage; it might have 
an easier time, say, redrawing the Northwest Territory’s border with Canada 
than redrawing Maryland’s border with the District of Columbia.66) Even the 
discrepancy between Seminole Tribe and earlier cases like Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer67 
was mostly comprehensible; abrogating immunity might turn out to be 
“incidental” to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on states, but 
not (say) to the Patent Clause.68 
Hyatt was more complicated, for the original action involved no federal 
power at all. The Nevada plainti, had +led suit in Nevada court, under 
Nevada law, against what the parties took to be an arm of the state of 
California.69 Whether Nevada had to respect the general law of immunity 
depended on its judicial and legislative powers. Nothing in the Constitution 
relevantly restricts those powers, and unlike federal powers, state powers 
don’t have to be conferred by the Constitution. Had Nevada been one of the 
 
63 +*& U.S. %% (*##!). 
64 +(& U.S. &"! (*###). 
65 M‘Culloch v. Maryland, *& U.S. (% Wheat.) '*!, %** (*)*#); see also Baude, supra note *", 
at #-((; Nelson, supra note **, at *!'#-%'; Sachs, supra note *", at *)&%-&+. 
66 For a broader treatment of courts’ jurisdictional limits and Congress’s potential power to 
abrogate them, see generally Stephen E. Sachs, The Unlimited Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, *"! 
VA. L. REV. *&"' (("("); see also id. at *&((, *&'"-'*, *&'( & n.*)" (noting that Congress has power 
to abrogate international law, but that it might not extend to state sovereign immunity); cf. infra 
Section II.C. (discussing abrogation and the Eleventh Amendment). 
67 %(& U.S. %%+ (*#&!). 
68 See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, +(& U.S. !(& (*###) 
(finding no abrogation power for patents). But see John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s 
Enforcement Powers, (""! SUP. CT. REV. '+' (questioning this power as to the Fourteenth Amendment). 
69 Cf. Hyatt Brief, supra note *", at (& n.! (noting that the parties might have been wrong about 
this). One of us may discuss this issue in future work. 
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original thirteen states, it arguably would have had the power before 
Rati+cation to abrogate the common-law immunity (at least within its own 
courts).70 So, under the equal-footing doctrine,71 it might seem that the Silver 
State retains this power today. 
The Supreme Court disagreed, but in so doing it made a mush of 
sovereign immunity. For example, it correctly acknowledged that the 
“sovereign immunity of the States	.	.	.	neither derives from, nor is limited by, 
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”72 But rather than recognizing this 
broader form of immunity as a form of persistent common law, the Court 
described it as coming from the Constitution itself—something “preserved in 
the constitutional design,” and perhaps even re-ected in “[t]he Constitution’s 
use of the term ‘States.’”73 
Here the Court subtly departed from the Constitution’s design as 
understood for nearly a century after its enactment. The Constitution did 
o,er states some security against the judgments of sister-state courts: by 
failing to make those judgments enforceable, not by imposing an a.rmative 
constitutional ban on rendering them.74 The Court was right to sense that an 
important safeguard of immunity had been lost, but the safeguard it 
resurrected wasn’t the one that had been part of the law. 
What was ignored. Having over-constitutionalized sovereign immunity in 
one respect, the Court then proceeded to undervalue the constitutional text 
in another. When a Nevada citizen +les suit against California, that suit is 
one “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by [a] 
Citizen[] of another State.”75 Of course, Gilbert Hyatt’s Nevada lawsuit 
wasn’t barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because the Amendment doesn’t 
a,ect state courts. (That’s why the Court’s opinion had to talk about airier 
stu,.) But when the Court took jurisdiction over the Board’s appeal, that did 
call the Eleventh Amendment into play. The Supreme Court, unlike the 
Nevada courts, exercises only “the judicial Power of the United States.”76 That 
power is constrained by the Eleventh Amendment, and it “shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
 
70 See The Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, ** U.S. (& Cranch) **!, *%! (*)*() (“Without doubt, 
the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this [immunity].”). 
71 See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, +!+ U.S. +&!, +#"-#* (("*() (describing the doctrine). 
72 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, *'# S.	Ct. *%)+, *%#! (("*#) (quoting Alden v. Maine, +(& U.S. 
&"!, &*' (*###)). 
73 Id. at *%#%, *%#!; see also Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The 
Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, #' NW. U. L. 
REV. )*#, )&'-&% (*###) (advancing this reading of “States” decades before Hyatt). 
74 See Hyatt Brief, supra note *", at *#-(( (describing the details of this arrangement, which we 
don’t rehash here). 
75 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
76 Id. art. III, §	*. 
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against one of the United States by Citizens of another State.”77 Hyatt was a 
citizen of Nevada when he +led suit, and both sides took him to have sued 
the State of California. As the matter was framed on appeal, the Supreme 
Court shouldn’t have been able to hear the case at all. 
To be sure, older precedents said that the Eleventh Amendment could be 
waived,78 and that it didn’t apply at all on review of state judgments.79 But 
the Hyatt Court was obviously willing to overrule cases it saw as incorrect,80 
and these other precedents were incorrect too—indeed, far more obviously 
incorrect than the one the Court had before it. Issues of subject-matter 
jurisdiction being nonwaivable,81 the Court shouldn’t have allowed the 
parties’ inattention to these questions to foreclose its own reconsideration. 
So the Justices in Hyatt exercised a jurisdiction explicitly forbidden by the 
Eleventh Amendment but blessed by the Supreme Court, in order to overrule 
a di!erent doctrine blessed by the Supreme Court but not actually in con-ict 
with the Eleventh Amendment. The resulting mess suggests that the 
Eleventh Amendment ought to be better understood. 
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Once we stop misreading the Amendment as the only font of state 
sovereign immunity, we’re free to read its text to mean just what it says. A 
straightforward reading of the Amendment has important consequences for 
modern doctrine. Consider each phrase in turn:82 
• The Judicial power of the United States—The Amendment is a limit on 
the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter 
jurisdiction is nonwaivable, and the Amendment is nonwaivable too. 
A diverse federal plainti, may not sue a state in law or equity, even 
with that state’s consent. 
• shall not be construed to extend—The Amendment is a cross-cutting 
limit on the judicial power. It forbids federal courts, in speci+ed cases, 
to exercise their subject-matter jurisdiction. That means the 
Amendment bars federal-question cases with the right alignment of 
parties, just as it bars all other suits within its terms. 
 
77 Id. amend. XI. 
78 See infra Section II.A. 
79 See infra Section II.E. 
80 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, *'# S.	Ct. *%)+, *%## (("*#); see also Gamble v. United States, 
*'# S.	Ct. *#!", *#)% (("*#) (Thomas, J., concurring) (con$rming that the author of Hyatt felt 
obligated not to adhere to “a decision that is demonstrably erroneous—i.e., one that is not a 
permissible interpretation of the text”). 
81 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, +(' U.S. )', #%-#+ (*##)). 
82 We borrow this organizational framework from Coan, supra note ', at (+(). 
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• to any suit—The Amendment is mandatory and exceptionless. As a 
result, it may not be abrogated by Congress. Neither Article I nor the 
Fourteenth Amendment let Congress override express constitutional 
limits on the judicial power. 
• in law or equity—The Amendment applies only to suits in law or 
equity. It leaves cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction alone. 
The unwritten immunity may apply in admiralty, but the di,erences 
between the Amendment and the common law make the limits of 
admiralty jurisdiction especially important. 
• commenced or prosecuted—The Amendment limits the scope of federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction, whether original or appellate, in actions by 
diverse plaintiffs against states. It thus forbids the Supreme Court to 
hear such cases on appeal from state court, regardless of who is appealing. 
• against one of the United States—The Amendment protects states, and 
only states. Its terms fail to shield Native American tribes, federal 
territories, the District of Columbia, Compact Clause entities, and so 
on. These entities may turn out to enjoy a common-law immunity, 
but not one under the Amendment. 
• by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State—The Amendment restricts suits by diverse plainti,s, and only 
by diverse plainti,s. If a state is sued by a Native American tribe, a 
federal corporation, a Compact Clause entity, a sister state as an 
assignee-for-collection-only, and so on, the common-law immunity 
might apply, but the Eleventh Amendment might not. 
The result is an Amendment significantly narrower than the general 
doctrine of immunity—but one that, where it applies, applies with drastic force. 
Indeed, this force may seem so drastic as to call the straightforward reading 
into question. Why should states be able to consent to federal suits by their 
own citizens, but not to suits by some other state’s citizens? Why should a 
plaintiff ’s residence affect Congress’s abrogation power (if it has one), or the 
Court’s ability to hear federal-question appeals? Why put a bar to some suits 
into the Constitution itself, but leave so many others (admiralty, foreign states, 
etc.) to the vagaries of the common law? What sense does any of this make? 
Stark as they are, these consequences -ow from rough-cut decisions that 
made sense in the context of the Eleventh Amendment’s enactment. The 
Amendment was drafted to solve a pressing problem: a -awed inference that 
Article III’s heads of subject-matter jurisdiction—particularly the state-
diversity provision—had repealed the states’ personal immunities. Attorney 
General Charles Lee, arguing the very +rst case to construe the new 
Amendment, described it as “the policy of the people to cut o, that branch 
of the judicial power, which had been supposed to authorize suits by 
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individuals against states.”83 The Amendment solved the problem, all right: 
it cut o, that branch with a chainsaw. 
The Amendment’s supporters had sought, as they repeated over and over 
again, to “remove any clause or article of the said Constitution which can be 
construed to imply or justify a decision that a State is compellable to answer 
in any suit by an individual or individuals in any Court of the United States.”84 
We will see in a moment why they thought the proposed text would achieve 
this, notwithstanding its limited reach. But their broad opposition to suits 
against states suggests that they weren’t trying to draft an Amendment whose 
language cut too carefully, and especially not one that might generate any 
negative inference supporting federal jurisdiction in other individual suits 
against states. If the Amendment extended its constitutional bar to a few 
more suits against states than was absolutely necessary, so much the better. 
The urgent circumstances to which the Eleventh Amendment responded 
made it logical to write it in a particular way. This choice still has 
consequences for modern law, even if its logic is now obsolete. 
A. “The Judicial power of the United States”: Waiver 
". Text and History 
The general law of sovereign immunity involves an immunity from 
compulsory process. Because it limits a court’s process, it a,ects whether a 
sovereign may be haled into court. And because it concerns compulsory 
process, it can be waived by consent, as part of the doctrine we now call 
“personal jurisdiction.”85 
The Eleventh Amendment is di,erent. It restricts “[t]he Judicial power 
of the United States”—a reference to subject-matter jurisdiction, not 
personal jurisdiction.86 It creates a categorical rule limiting the federal courts’ 
power to adjudicate certain cases, even if the parties were ready and willing 
to appear. Eleventh Amendment cases lie outside “[t]he Judicial power of the 
 
83 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, ' U.S. (' Dall.) '&), ')* (*&#)) (argument of Charles Lee). 
84 Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court (Sept. (&, *&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, 
at %%", %%" (emphasis added); see also Resolution of the Connecticut General Assembly (Oct. (#, 
*&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !"#, !"#; Proceedings of the South Carolina Senate (Dec. *&, 
*&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !*", !**; Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates (Dec. 
(&, *&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !**, !**; Proceedings of the Pennsylvania House of 
Representatives (Dec. '", *&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !*(, !*'; Resolution of North Carolina 
General Assembly (Jan. **, *&#%), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !*+, !*+; Proceedings of a Joint 
Session of the New Hampshire General Court (Jan. (', *&#%), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !*), !*). 
85 Nelson, supra note **, at *+!+. 
86 U.S. CONST. amend. XI; accord Nelson, supra note **, at *!*". 
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United States,” so they can’t be tried by consent, any more than two citizens 
of Pennsylvania can agree to bring their fender-bender into federal court. 
This choice of language was consequential. Historically, if a court lacked 
power to compel a party’s attendance, that problem was cured by the party’s 
voluntary appearance.87 The same doctrine applied to sovereign immunity. 
For example, in his dissent in Chisholm, Justice Iredell noted that an earlier 
case against Maryland hadn’t presented the issue, “because the Attorney-
General of the State voluntarily appeared.”88 And the +rst post-Chisholm 
amendment proposal, o,ered by Representative Sedgwick of Massachusetts 
the day after the decision was announced, was designed to protect the states 
from compulsory federal process, providing that “no state shall be liable to be 
made a party defendant” in private federal suits.89 
But the actual Amendment grew out of a di,erent proposal. Introduced 
the next day by Senator Strong of Massachusetts, this draft restricted federal 
subject-matter jurisdiction and the extent of “The Judicial Power.”90 While 
we can’t read its drafters’ minds, we do know that a number of federal suits 
were already pending against states; one case against New York eventually 
went to trial and +nal judgment while the Amendment was out for 
rati+cation.91 Even if a new amendment eventually restored an immunity 
from compulsory process, there were still plausible arguments that the states 
dragged into court under Chisholm had lost their immunity in the interim. 
Designing the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction 
eliminated this problem, making it clear that suits would have to be wiped o, 
the docket without any question of waiver or forfeiture.92 
The Amendment’s contemporaries recognized the di,erence. Although 
the requisite number of states had rati+ed the Amendment by "*$), the news 
from the state legislatures didn’t reach Philadelphia until "*$&, when 
rati+cation was +nally declared.93 As soon as this happened, the Supreme 
Court scheduled argument in Hollingsworth v. Virginia, and it con+rmed that 
the Amendment had uncompromisingly eradicated all pending suits.94 
Plainti,s’ counsel had argued that applying the Amendment to pending cases 
 
87 See, e.g., Mayhew v. Thatcher, *# U.S. (! Wheat.) *(#, *'" (*)(*); Pollard v. Dwight, ) U.S. 
(% Cranch) %(*, %()-(# (*)")). 
88 Chisholm v. Georgia, ( U.S. (( Dall.) %*#, %(# (*&#'). 
89 Proceedings of the United States House of Representatives (Feb. *#, *&#'), GAZETTE OF 
THE U.S. (Phila.), Feb. (", *&#', reprinted in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !"+, !"+-"!. 
90 Resolution in the United States Senate (Feb. (", *&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !"&, !"&. 
91 For descriptions of these suits, see + DHSC, supra note '!, at !*-!! (New York); id. at ()(-
)+ (Virginia); id. at '!%-!+ (Massachusetts). 
92 See Nelson, supra note **, at *!"%-"+ (“By using the language of subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Eleventh Amendment kept the Supreme Court from proceeding to judgment in these pending cases	.	.	.	.”). 
93 + DHSC, supra note '!, at ()# & n.#&. 
94 Id. at ()#; Hollingsworth v. Virginia, ' U.S. (' Dall.) '&), ')( (*&#)). 
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would be a “great hardship” and contrary to “[t]he spirit of the constitution,” 
permitting “the mischief of an ex post facto Constitution” (as well as arguing, 
more famously, that the Amendment hadn’t been validly adopted).95 To the 
contrary, said Attorney General Lee, the Amendment had been written to 
“cut o,” or “annihilate[] a part, of the judicial authority of the United States”; 
it was “equally operative in all the cases against states, where there has been 
an appearance, or even where there have been a trial and judgment.”96 Lee 
won in a rout. As Dallas’s report puts it: 
The Court, on the day succeeding the argument, delivered an unanimous 
opinion, that the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not 
be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a state was sued 
by the citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.97 
As a subject-matter companion to the states’ personal immunities, the 
Eleventh Amendment’s limited restrictions made a good deal of sense. 
Consider the basis for the erroneous decision in Chisholm. Some provisions 
of Article III do seem to e,ect a waiver of immunity: the “judicial Power” 
over “Controversies between two or more States,” for example, suggests that 
at least one state will always have to be a defendant, and it would be 
implausible to provide for such cases if the defendant state didn’t need to 
show up.98 Chisholm’s supporters thought the same was true of the power to 
hear controversies “between a State and Citizens of another State,” or foreign 
“Citizens or Subjects”; Chisholm’s many critics thought this inference 
unwarranted.99 But an amendment wiping out federal subject-matter 
jurisdiction in diverse-plainti, cases against states would eliminate the only 
plausible grounds for such an inference: none of the other heads of subject-
matter jurisdiction posed any similar threat of being misconstrued. (Maybe 
some, like Justice Wilson, might have found a similar waiver in a general grant 
 
95 ' U.S. at '&)-)" (arguments of counsel). 
96 Id. at ')"-)* (emphasis omitted). 
97 Id. at ')( (emphasis added). 
98 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *; cf. Debates of the Virginia Convention (June (", *&))) in *" 
DHRC, supra note '', at *%*(, *%*% (statement of James Madison) (footnote omitted) (“The next case, 
where two or more States are the parties, is not objected to. Provision is made for this by the existing 
articles of Confederation; and there can be no impropriety in referring such disputes to this tribunal.”). 
99 Compare Chisholm v. Georgia, ( U.S. (( Dall.) %*#, %&' (*&#') (opinion of Jay, C.J.), with id. 
at %%#-+" (Iredell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “every word in the Constitution may have its full 
e-ect without involving this consequence”); see also Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Nathaniel 
Pendleton (Aug. *", *&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at ('(, ('' (admitting that Article III’s words 
“will extend to the case,” but doubting whether, “when they may by satis$ed by an Application to 
one which is common & Ordinary, & the other is new & extraordinary	.	.	.	sound construction would 
con$ne the General words to the $rst case”). 
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of federal-question jurisdiction; very few others would have joined him.100) 
That’s why an Eleventh Amendment focused only on state-diversity suits 
reassured those who feared “any suit by an individual” against a state;101 the 
Amendment eliminated subject-matter jurisdiction over some suits, the 
better to preserve a personal-jurisdiction immunity against the rest. 
That’s also why one ought to be careful with modern claims “that 
Congress,” in proposing the Eleventh Amendment, “acted not to change but 
to restore the original constitutional design.”102 By and large, the Amendment 
had restored the original design; private federal suits against states were 
barred, one way or another. But the Amendment didn’t quite reestablish the 
status quo ante Chisholmum, because the new system of immunity was slightly 
more complicated than the old. Maybe the Amendment could have been 
drafted di,erently, reasserting the states’ pre-Chisholm immunity from 
compulsory process (with special language to address waivers in pending 
cases, and so on). Instead, the drafters found it simpler to supplement one 
immunity with another. In so doing, they adopted a nonwaivable limit on 
federal judicial power.103 
'. Judicial Misconstruction 
This understanding of the Amendment survived for nearly a century, 
until the Supreme Court botched it in "&&(. Clark v. Barnard was a 
complicated equity suit about a disputed sum of money arising out of the 
bankruptcy of a railroad company.104 The company’s o.cers deposited 
/"##,### with the treasurer of Boston, and then they used that deposit as 
 
100 Compare Chisholm, ( U.S. at %+& (opinion of Wilson, J.) (arguing that, “[a]s to the purposes 
of the Union	.	.	.	Georgia is NOT a sovereign state,” because “the Supreme Power resides in the body 
of the people”), with Letter from John Wereat to Edward Telfair (Feb. (*, *&#'), in + DHSC, supra 
note '!, at (((, ((' (repeating Rep. Sedgwick’s statement doubting that “any professional Gentleman 
would have risqued his reputation on such a forced construction of the clause in the Constitution”), 
Nelson, supra note **, at *+)" n.#& (noting contemporary “astonishment” at Wilson’s opinion), and 
id. at *+)% (“Suits against a state need not be regarded as suits against an impersonal (and therefore 
nonsovereign) government, but can instead be seen as suits against the sovereign people of the state 
in their collective capacity.”). 
101 See sources cited supra note )%. 
102 Alden v. Maine, +(& U.S. &"!, &(( (*###). 
103 Modern caselaw has extended state sovereign immunity to include limits on federal 
executive power, when that power is exercised in the form of an administrative-agency adjudication 
initiated by a private party. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., +'+ U.S. &%', &!" 
((""(). Thankfully, the Court didn’t attribute those limits to the Eleventh Amendment, as opposed 
to background principles of immunity. See id. at &+%. While the breadth of the common-law 
immunity is outside this Article’s scope, we note that the Court partly rested its decision on the 
agency’s purported ability to bind private rights, id. at &!', traditionally something that only judicial 
power could do. See William Baude, Adjudication Outside Article III, *'' HARV. L. REV. *+**, *+%*-%&, 
*+&&-&) (("("). 
104 Clark v. Barnard, *") U.S. %'!, %'!-'& (*))'). 
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surety for a /"##,### bond from the treasurer of Rhode Island. After 
bankruptcy, the railroad’s assignees +led a suit in federal court trying to get 
the money back from the Boston treasurer and to stop the Rhode Island 
treasurer from collecting it.105 
Clark, the Rhode Island treasurer, tried to have the suit dismissed on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds. He argued that the real party in interest was 
his employer, the State of Rhode Island, and that the plainti,s were citizens 
of Connecticut and Massachusetts.106 But Clark had been sued “as a wrong-
doer in his individual capacity,” so the Amendment may not have applied.107 
The plot, such as it was, thickened. The Boston treasurer paid the 
disputed sum into court, and the State of Rhode Island itself intervened in 
the case and +led a claim for the funds. But the lower court awarded the 
money to the railroad, at which point the state and its treasurer both appealed 
to the Supreme Court.108 The Court concluded that the Eleventh 
Amendment question was resolved by the state’s choice to +le a claim: 
We are relieved, however, from its consideration by the voluntary appearance 
of the State in intervening as a claimant of the fund in court. The immunity from 
suit belonging to a State, which is respected and protected by the Constitution within 
the limits of the judicial power of the United States, is a personal privilege which it may 
waive at pleasure; so that in a suit, otherwise well brought, in which a State had 
sufficient interest to entitle it to become a party defendant, its appearance in a 
court of the United States would be a voluntary submission to its jurisdiction; 
while, of course, those courts are always open to it as a suitor in controversies 
between it and citizens of other States. In the present case the State of Rhode 
Island appeared in the cause and presented and prosecuted a claim to the fund 
in controversy, and thereby made itself a party to the litigation to the full extent 
required for its complete determination. It became an actor as well as defendant, 
 
105 Id. at %%(-%+. 
106 Id. The assignees—George Barnard, Charles Bradley, and Charles Chapman—didn’t state 
their own personal citizenship in the bill of complaint, and the Supreme Court record sheds no light 
on the question. (Having been appointed by a federal court, they may not have needed to establish 
diversity jurisdiction.) The Rhode Island treasurer relied on the railroad’s having been chartered in 
Connecticut and Massachusetts. See Transcript of Rec. at !, Clark, *") U.S. %'! (No. (!!) (“[T]he 
complainants in said bill have commenced and do prosecute the same in their capacity of assignees 
in bankruptcy of a corporation which is a citizen of other States of the United States than the said 
State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations .	.	.	.”); accord id. at *(. The Supreme Court had 
by that time adopted the doctrine that a corporation, for Article III purposes, is a citizen of its state 
of incorporation. See Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, %' U.S. (( How.) %#&, 
++)-+# (*)%%). But see Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, # U.S. (+ Cranch) !*, #* (*)"#) (holding that a 
corporation’s citizenship depends on that of “the real persons who come into court, in this case, 
under their corporate name”). 
107 Clark, *") U.S. at %%); see also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., (( U.S. (# Wheat.) &'), )+&-+) 
(*)(%) (limiting the Eleventh Amendment’s scope to suits in which a state is a party of record). 
108 Clark, *") U.S. at %%+-%!. 
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as by its intervention the proceeding became one in the nature of an 
interpleader, in which it became necessary to adjudicate the adverse rights of 
the State and the appellees to the fund, to which both claimed title.109 
So far as we can tell, this is the +rst time the Supreme Court actually held 
the Eleventh Amendment to be waivable. Several decades earlier, it had heard 
an appeal in a state-court suit to which Arkansas had consented; but the 
plainti, was an Arkansas citizen, and so the Amendment wasn’t involved.110 
Two months before Clark, in New Hampshire v. Louisiana, the Court discussed 
in dicta the Amendment’s “evident purpose” of “prohibit[ing] all suits against 
a State by or for citizens of other States, or aliens, without the consent of the 
State to be sued.”111 But the Court’s confusion here might be forgivable: the 
states’ preexisting personal immunity could indeed be waived by consent, and 
as consent wasn’t at issue in New Hampshire, there was no reason for the Court 
to think carefully about it. 
In any event, Clark did reach a holding on waiver: the wrong holding. The 
Eleventh Amendment allows states to prosecute claims in federal court; it 
speaks only of suits “commenced or prosecuted against” a state.112 This was 
enough to resolve the controversy in Clark, in which the state had +led its 
own claim to the funds, becoming “actor as well as defendant.”113 But it doesn’t 
follow that a state, contrary to the Amendment’s text, can let a suit be 
commenced or prosecuted against it—i.e., that a state can become a defendant, 
even voluntarily. Having con-ated a state’s choice to initiate a claim with a 
state’s choice to defend one, the Court gave no explanation of how the latter 
complied with the Eleventh Amendment, nor (of course) did it discuss any 
of the history mentioned above. 
 
109 Id. at %%&-%) (emphasis added). 
110 Curran v. Arkansas, +! U.S. (*+ How.) '"%, '"# (*)+'); Transcript of Rec. at ', Curran, +! 
U.S. '"% (No. ("+); cf. Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., (( U.S. (# Wheat.) #"%, #"&-") 
(*)(%) (suggesting that “[t]he State of Georgia, by giving to the Bank the capacity to sue and be 
sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the 
Bank, and waives all the privileges of that character,” but resolving the Eleventh Amendment 
argument on the ground that “[t]he State does not, by becoming a corporator, identify itself with 
the corporation,” and that “[t]he Planters’ Bank of Georgia is not the State of Georgia” for purposes 
of subject-matter jurisdiction). 
111 *") U.S. &!, #* (*))') (emphasis added). 
112 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
113 Clark, *") U.S. at %%); accord Paul Horton, Lapides v. Board of Regents and the 
Untrustworthiness of Unanimous Supreme Court Decisions, %* SAN DIEGO L. REV. *"+&, *")* ((""%) 
(“The Eleventh Amendment was irrelevant to this issue because the Amendment had nothing to 
say about litigation initiated by a State in federal court	.	.	.	.”); cf. ' BLACKSTONE, supra note (+, at 
*(+ (di-erentiating among “actor, reus, and judex,” in which “the actor, or plainti-,	.	.	.	complains of 
an injury done”). 
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Once the Court had openly stated that the Eleventh Amendment was a 
“personal privilege which [the state] may waive at pleasure,”114 the seeds of 
confusion were sown. The Court repeated the point in Hans v. Louisiana,115 a 
case which famously fell outside the Amendment’s terms, and one which is 
regularly accused of con-ating the Eleventh Amendment with the common-
law immunity. Sure enough, the Court kept repeating its consent claim in 
actual Eleventh Amendment cases such as Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line 
Railroad Co.116 and Missouri v. Fiske.117 And it reiterated the statement in other, 
more apt, cases such as Smith v. Reeves, brought by a federally chartered 
railroad,118 and Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, which discussed a prospective 
suit in state court.119 
A few Justices in the "$*#s and "$&#s brie-y attempted to disentangle the 
issues of consent in real Eleventh Amendment cases from those in other cases 
involving immunity.120 But the attempt failed quickly. By the time its modern 
cases addressed questions of constructive waiver121 or removal,122 the Court 
was describing consent as a “long recognized”123 and “long accepted”124 
principle of sovereign immunity doctrine, paying no attention to whether the 
cases actually involved the Eleventh Amendment.125 Some lower courts today 
 
114 Clark, *") U.S. at %%&. 
115 *'% U.S. *, *& (*)#"). 
116 ("" U.S. (&', ()% (*#"!) (out-of-state shareholders). 
117 (#" U.S. *), (%-(+ (*#'') (diversity litigation over a trust). 
118 *&) U.S. %'!, %%"-%* (*#""). On whether this case should have been seen to fall within the 
Eleventh Amendment, see infra Section II.G. 
119 (!% U.S. %&(, %)' (*#(%). 
120 As Justice Brennan wrote, 
[t]he literal wording is thus a .at prohibition against the federal judiciary’s 
entertainment of suits against even a consenting State brought by citizens of another 
State or by aliens .	.	.	. It is true that cases since decided have said that federal courts 
do have power to entertain suits against consenting States. None has yet o-ered, 
however, a persuasively principled explanation for that conclusion in the face of the 
wording of the Amendment. 
Emps. of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare, %** U.S. (&#, '*" (*#&') 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at (#+ n.*" (Marshall, J., concurring) (relying heavily on Clark 
v. Barnard to reply to Justice Brennan); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., %#* U.S. *, ('-(% (*#)#) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (making a similar point regarding congressional abrogation). 
121 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., +(& U.S. !!!, !&+-&! (*###). 
122 See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., +'+ U.S. !*', !(" ((""(). 
123 Fla. Prepaid, +(& U.S. at !&+. 
124 Lapides, +'+ U.S. at !*#. 
125 Compare, e.g., Fla. Prepaid, +(& U.S. at !&"-&* (a “New Jersey chartered bank” suing “an arm 
of the State of Florida”), with Lapides, +'+ U.S. at !*! (Georgia professor suing the state university). 
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even suggest that the Eleventh Amendment immunity is more easily waived 
than its common-law predecessor.126 
All of this is wrong. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the courts’ 
subject-matter jurisdiction; it can’t be waived. That was a costly choice on its 
drafters’ part, but one made for good reason. No amount of contrary judicial 
assertion, especially without reasoning or explanation, alters the 
Amendment’s original meaning. 
B. “shall not be construed to extend”: Federal Questions 
As a textual matter, the Eleventh Amendment provides a rule of 
construction (“shall not be construed”) for how far “[t]he Judicial power of 
the United States” may “extend.”127 It thus refers to all of Article III, not just 
to a few heads of jurisdiction. For more than thirty-+ve years, however, a 
group of scholars and judges have argued that the Amendment was 
understood to have a more restrictive scope.128 On this “diversity theory,” the 
Amendment doesn’t actually apply to the judicial power as a whole. Rather, 
it only reconstrues the state-diversity provisions in particular, insisting that 
“Controversies .	.	. between a State” and a private party be read to refer to 
states as potential plainti,s but not as potential defendants.129 That leaves 
every other head of jurisdiction in Article III wide open for private suits—in 
particular, the jurisdiction over “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority.”130 
Other scholars, in response, found the evidence inconclusive or 
unpersuasive.131 For a time, the issue seemed to recede in importance. The 
sovereign immunity caselaw of the "$$#s made the battles over diversity 
theory seem like sideshows: by enforcing “Eleventh Amendment immunity” 
well outside the Amendment’s terms, the Court made the precise scope of 
those terms less relevant. Whether those cases were rightly decided (if 
wrongly reasoned) turns on the states’ common-law immunity from process. 
But if the Amendment is of a di,erent character than the common-law 
immunity, then the diversity question becomes important again. 
 
126 See, e.g., Church v. Missouri, #*' F.'d &'!, &%(–%' ()th Cir. ("*#) (holding that removal by 
a state waives Eleventh Amendment immunity but not “general state sovereign immunity”); 
Beaulieu v. Vermont, )"& F.'d %&), %)+-)& ((d Cir. ("*+) (same). 
127 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
128 See sources cited supra note %; see also Nelson, supra note **, at *!*+ (“There is much to be 
said for the view that the Eleventh Amendment targets only Article III’s grants of diversity 
jurisdiction .	.	.	.”). 
129 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *. 
130 Id. 
131 See sources cited supra note '. 
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On balance, we +nd the diversity theory unpersuasive. It isn’t the most 
natural reading of the text. It has weaker historical support than the more 
categorical reading. And the modern rationales for the diversity theory are 
quite distant from the concerns actually motivating the Amendment. On this 
point we +nd ourselves in agreement with prevailing doctrine. 
". Text 
Here is the best textual account of the diversity theory, as we understand 
it. The Eleventh Amendment was designed to reverse Chisholm. Madison and 
Marshall had warned against reading Article III’s heads of state-diversity 
jurisdiction to authorize individual suits against states, but Chisholm did so 
anyway. So the Amendment’s rule of construction corrected this particular 
misreading. It may have used broad language, but its words mirrored the 
phrasing of the state-diversity provisions, and it was implicitly restricted to 
that speci+c set of cases.132 Just as the original-jurisdiction clauses included 
“those [cases] in which a State shall be Party,” meaning only cases +led under 
state-party heads of jurisdiction,133 and just as the Judiciary Act of "*&$ spoke 
of suits “where	.	.	.	an alien is a party,” meaning only cases of alienage 
jurisdiction,134 so the Amendment’s reference to diverse-plainti, suits against 
states meant only those suits speci+cally relying on state-diversity 
jurisdiction. In other words, we should read the Amendment as providing 
that the judicial power “shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, [by reason of its having been] commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.” 
This is surely a possible reading. But we don’t consider it the best reading, 
for at least three reasons. 
First, as noted above, the diversity reading isn’t quite at ease with the text, 
which addresses “[t]he Judicial power” as a whole, rather than any particular 
heads of jurisdiction. As above, the Eleventh Amendment didn’t just reverse 
Chisholm; it supplemented the personal immunity that shielded the states 
with a subject-matter restriction, which among other things the states could 
 
132 Cf. Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment: Normative Defense 
and Implications, *' DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y *!&, *&*-&% (("*&) (discussing tacit restrictions). 
133 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. (; see Amar, Marbury, supra note %, at %%%; Nelson, supra note 
**, at *!*! n.(+#. But see United States v. Texas, *%' U.S. !(*, !%% (*)#() (holding that the Court’s 
original jurisdiction in state-party cases extends to “all cases mentioned in the preceding clause in 
which a State may, of right, be made a party defendant,” or “may, of right, institute a suit in a court 
of the United States”). 
134 Ch. (", §	**, * Stat. &', &); see also Mossman v. Higginson, % U.S. (% Dall.) *(, *% (*)"") 
(“[A]s the legislative power of conferring jurisdiction on the federal Courts, is .	.	. con$ned to suits 
between citizens and foreigners, we must so expound the terms of the law .	.	.	.”). 
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no longer waive. So we already know that Amendment wasn’t narrowly 
tailored to do the minimum necessary to undo Chisholm’s damage. (Some 
scholars read “shall not be construed to extend,” added in place of the simpler 
“shall not extend,”135 to limit the Amendment to a Chisholm +x.136 But in the 
nineteenth century, this language was read as necessary to apply the 
Amendment to previous cases.137 And in the eighteenth century, the phrase 
was used not only to resolve interpretive uncertainties,138 but also to carve 
out statutory exceptions irrespective of any interpretive disputes.139) 
Second, we should be especially wary of reading tacit restrictions into the 
text of an “explanatory” provision like the Eleventh Amendment.140 As an 
“authoritative declaration” of the proper construction of another text,141 the 
Amendment had the status of “an explanatory law,” which is how Attorney 
General Lee described it in Hollingsworth v. Virginia.142 Courts were 
traditionally expected to “con+ne the construction” of explanatory statutes 
“strictly to the letter,” for “[o]therwise there should be an explanation upon 
 
135 Compare Resolution in the United States Senate (Feb. (", *&#'), in + DHSC, supra note '!, 
at !"&, !"& (“shall not extend”), with Resolution in the United States Senate (Jan. (, *&#%), in + 
DHSC, supra note '!, at !*', !*' (“shall not be construed to extend”). 
136 E.g., Amar, Sovereignty, supra note %, at *%)(; Fletcher, Reply, supra note %, at *(&"-&%. 
137 See Ex parte Poulson, *# F.	Cas. *("+, *("& (C.C.E.D. Pa. *)'+) (No. **,'+") (Baldwin, 
Circuit Justice) (taking the Eleventh Amendment phrase to “refer[] to the past, the present, and the 
future”); accord Dudley’s Case, & F.	Cas. **+", **+* (C.C.E.D. Pa. *)%() (No. %,**%) (Baldwin, Circuit 
Justice) (“[I]t annulled all jurisdiction of such cases then pending	.	.	.	.”); Nelson, supra note **, at 
*!"% n.((( (citing Dudley’s Case). 
138 See, e.g., An Act Concerning Consuls and Vice-Consuls, ch. (%, §	#, * Stat. (+%, (+& (*&#() 
(providing that a statutory “speci$cation of certain powers and duties” of U.S. consuls “shall not be 
construed to the exclusion of others”); Act of Aug. %, *&#", ch. '+, §	%!, * Stat. *%+, *!# (providing 
that a statutory means of appraising imported goods “shall not be construed to exclude other proof” 
at trial of the goods’ actual cost). 
139 See, e.g., Act of June +, *&#%, ch. +", §	(, * Stat. ')*, ')' (providing that a statute forbidding 
“any person” within the United States to enlist in a foreign military “shall not be construed to extend 
to” enlistment taking place on foreign warships, $tted as warships at the time they entered the 
United States, if the enlistee is a citizen or subject of the foreign state, with which the United States 
is then at peace); accord An Act to Establish Certain Impost Duties on Various Foreign Articles 
Imported into this State, ch. %" (N.H. Mar. %, *&)!), reprinted in + LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE *%!, 
*%!, *%) (Henry Harrison Metcalf ed., *#*!) (providing that an import duty “upon all other Goods, 
Wares and Merchandize” “shall not be construed to extend .	.	. to the Article of Salt”); An Act for 
the Support of Government, ch. !', *&#( N.Y. Laws '!#, '!# (restricting the number of judges by 
providing that the provision for their /&+" salary “shall not be construed to extend to any judges of 
the said court, that may be appointed after their number shall amount to $ve”); *&)" N.C. Sess. 
Laws, ch. &, §	', reprinted in (% STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA '(%, '(+ (Walter Clark ed., 
*#"+) (providing that a .at prohibition on lotteries “shall not be construed to extend to any lottery 
established	.	.	.	for the encouragement of any school or schools”). 
140 See Pfander, supra note %, at *'(' (describing the Amendment as explanatory); Clark, supra 
note *(, at *)#!-#& (same). 
141 Respublica v. Cobbett, ' U.S. (' Dall.) %!&, %&(, ( Yeates '+( (Pa. *&#)) (argument of counsel). 
142 ' U.S. (' Dall.) '&), ')* (*&#)). 
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an explanation.”143 Thus, Lee argued, the Amendment couldn’t “be 
expounded by foreign matter”;144 it had to be taken to mean what it says. If 
we’re to read the Amendment under the prevailing law of interpretation,145 then 
we should do as the Court did in Hollingsworth, and read “any suit” as if it meant 
“any suit”—including “any case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the 
citizens of another state, or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.”146 
Third, the diversity theory has trouble explaining the Amendment’s 
limitation to “any suit in law or equity.”147 The only apparent function of this 
phrase is to exempt admiralty cases. As noted below, on the straightforward 
reading of the Amendment this isn’t too strange; no one had read anything 
about compulsory process against states into the phrase “Cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction,” so no changes were required.148 (Justice 
Washington o,ered a related explanation: admiralty could be safely excluded 
from the Amendment, because admiralty courts generally acted in rem, rather 
than directly upon defendants in personam.149) But the basic idea of the 
diversity theory is that the Amendment only amended “the state-citizen 
diversity clause,” and that it “was not intended to eliminate or restrict other 
heads of jurisdiction,” such as “admiralty jurisdiction or the federal question 
jurisdiction.”150 If a diversity-theory Amendment wouldn’t have reached 
admiralty anyway, then the reference to “law or equity” was mere 
surplusage,151 and especially puzzling surplusage at that: “Law and Equity” 
are paired in only one other part of the Constitution, namely Article III’s 
 
143 Sawyer v. Shannon, (* F. Cas. +&#, +)( (C.C.D. Tenn. *)"#) (No. *(,%"+) (Todd, Circuit 
Justice); see also % MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW *!+" (“The Sense 
of Words used in an Explanatory Statute ought not to be extended by an equitable Constructio[n]: 
but their Meaning, the Explanatory Statute being a legislative Construction of the Words used in a 
former Statute, ought to be strictly adhered to.”). 
144 Hollingsworth, ' U.S. at ')*. 
145 See Baude & Sachs, supra note *!, at ***)-("; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 
*"' NW. U. L. REV. &+*, &+( ((""#). 
146 Hollingsworth, ' U.S. at ')(. 
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (emphasis added). 
148 See infra Section II.D. 
149 United States v. Bright, (% F. Cas. *('(, *('! (C.C.D. Pa. *)"#) (No. *%,!%&) (Washington, 
Circuit Justice); see also Ex parte Madrazzo, '( U.S. (& Pet.) !(&, !(& (*)'') (argument of counsel); 
id. at !'( (opinion of the Court) (holding that because the suit wasn’t really in rem, it was “a mere 
personal suit against a state,” which “no private person has a right to commence”); David J. 
Bederman, Admiralty and the Eleventh Amendment, &( NOTRE DAME L. REV. #'+, #'! (*##&); 
Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, #! 
NW. U. L. REV. *"(&, *"&'-&% ((""(); Fletcher, Reply, supra note %, at *(&% & n.&". 
150 Fletcher, Reply, supra note %, at *(!%. 
151 Justice Washington’s gesture toward the diversity theory shows the same hesitation: he 
suggested in Bright that the Amendment’s rule of construction applies speci$cally to the “above 
provision” (on state-diversity cases), but still went on to consider at great length its potential 
application to admiralty cases. See Bright, (% F. Cas. at *('!. 
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head of federal-question jurisdiction.152 This pairing suggests that the 
Amendment still applies to federal-question cases—and that it’s more than a 
mere commentary on the state-diversity provisions alone. 
'. History 
Sometimes a reading that seems odd today was nonetheless the better 
reading when a text became law. But so far as we can tell, that wasn’t the case 
with the Eleventh Amendment. If anything, the historical record seems to 
favor the categorical reading. Without rehearsing the extensive historical 
debate over the diversity theory,153 we highlight a few pieces of contemporary 
evidence that we +nd especially persuasive, and we o,er some observations 
on subsequent developments in the nineteenth century. 
The Gallatin proposal. While the Eleventh Amendment was under debate in 
the Senate, future Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin unsuccessfully proposed 
to exempt any cases arising under U.S. treaties. His draft would have read: 
The judicial power of the United States, except in cases arising under treaties, made 
under the authority of the United States, shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by 
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.154 
Gallatin’s proposal was voted down.155 But because cases arising under 
treaties already fell under Article III’s head of federal-question jurisdiction, 
the fact that he thought the exemption necessary—and that the rest of the 
Senate rejected it—seems to con+rm that the +nal draft of the Amendment, 
which lacks this phrase, applied to federal-question cases. 
To be sure, as with all rejected proposals, it’s possible that Gallatin’s 
proposed exemption was thought unnecessary, rather than objectionable; 
maybe the other senators thought treaty cases were already exempt.156 But 
after Gallatin’s proposal was rejected, he was one of only two senators to vote 
 
152 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. * (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority	.	.	.	.”). 
153 For a more complete history of this debate, see sources cited supra notes '–%, *'. 
154 Proceedings of the United States Senate (Jan. *%, *&#%), in + DHSC, supra note '!, at !*&, 
!*& (emphasis added). 
155 Id. 
156 See James E. Pfander & Jessica Dwinell, A Declaratory Theory of State Accountability, *"( VA. 
L. REV. *+', *&) n.#! (("*!) (suggesting that “others in the chamber may have quietly persuaded 
Gallatin and his supporters that the change was unnecessary, given the failure of the Eleventh 
Amendment to threaten treaty-based claims”). 
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against the Amendment, with twenty-three voting in favor.157 So he, at least, 
seemed to think the proposal necessary. 
That’s also the more natural inference, given the circumstances.158 The 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had been outspoken in seeking a 
constitutional amendment in response to Chisholm,159 and the pending suit 
against the Commonwealth (Vassall v. Massachusetts) involved a claim under 
the Treaty of Paris.160 Yet the Massachusetts delegation all voted for the 
Eleventh Amendment as written,161 apparently without expressing any 
concern that it might let in future treaty claims. We’re therefore inclined to 
agree with the late David Currie that “the historical context belies any 
attempt at wishful thinking: as the prompt rejection of all ameliorating 
alterations shows, Congress was in no mood to permit any federal suit against 
a state by a citizen of another state or of a foreign country.”162 
At the time, of course, there was no statutory provision for general 
federal-question jurisdiction; that would arrive (albeit brie-y) seven years 
later.163 So it’s theoretically conceivable, as some scholars have suggested, that 
the senators who roundly rejected Gallatin’s proposal only wanted to forbid 
those treaty cases, such as Vassall, which also relied on the constitutional grant 
of original state-party jurisdiction—while still hoarding the possibility of 
granting statutory federal-question jurisdiction over such cases in the future.164 
But given the expressed views of the Amendment’s supporters,165 that strikes 
us as by far the less natural reading of the available record. The more natural 
reading of these events is that Gallatin wanted diverse plainti,s to be able to 
bring treaty claims, that the Eleventh Amendment as written would bar them, 
and that twenty-three other senators thought this was +ne. 
 
157 Proceedings of the United States Senate, supra note *+%, at !*&. The two “nays,” Sens. 
Gallatin and Rutherfurd, were from Pennsylvania and New Jersey respectively. Id. at !""; John 
Rutherfurd, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/
MemberDetails?memIndex0R"""++" [https://perma.cc/#SNS-HT+C]. 
158 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, *&)#–*)"*, at *#&-#) (*##&) (“One can imagine a scenario in which a motion to exempt 
treaty cases is voted down as unnecessary because the amendment itself is inapplicable to cases 
arising under federal law. But the language of the actual amendment is not conducive to such an 
interpretation	.	.	.	.”). 
159 See Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, supra note )%, at %%". 
160 See + DHSC, supra note '!, at '+%-++. 
161 Proceedings of the United States Senate, supra note *+%, at !*&; Caleb Strong, 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/
Home/MemberDetails?memIndex0S""*""# [https://perma.cc/&Y!X-TQ')]; George Cabot, 
BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., https://bioguideretro.congress.gov/Home/
MemberDetails?memIndex0C"""""# [https://perma.cc/S%P&-XHNE]. 
162 CURRIE, supra note *+), at *#). 
163 Judiciary Act of *)"*, ch. %, §	**, ( Stat. )#, #( (repealed *)"(). 
164 See Fletcher, Reply, supra note %, at *()+-)&; Gibbons, supra note %, at *#'+-'!. 
165 See, e.g., supra note )% and accompanying text. 
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The Hollingsworth oral argument. Once the Eleventh Amendment was 
declared rati+ed, the Supreme Court heard argument in Hollingsworth, where 
the plainti,s gamely asserted that the Amendment exempted pending 
cases.166 The plainti,s faced an uphill battle for several reasons, among them 
the words “commenced or prosecuted”: a case commenced before rati+cation 
might still be prosecuted afterwards, and so caught in the Amendment’s net. 
In response, the plainti,s read “prosecuted” to refer speci+cally to a set of 
federal-question cases—namely, those initiated against a state in its own courts 
(by consent), and then brought to the Supreme Court on appeal: 
It may be said, however, that the word “commenced” is used in relation to 
future suits, and that the word “prosecuted” is applied to suits previously 
instituted. But it will be su!cient to answer, in favor of the benign 
construction, for which the Plainti"s contend, that the word “commencing” 
[sic] may, on this ground, be con#ned to actions originally instituted here, 
and the word “prosecuted” to suits brought hither by writ of error, or appeal. 
For, it is to be shewn, that a state may be sued originally, and yet not in the 
Supreme Court, though the Supreme Court will have an appellate 
jurisdiction; as where the laws of a state authorize such suits in her own courts, 
and there is drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or statute of, or authority 
exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity.167 
The plainti,s’ reading of “prosecuted” isn’t very persuasive, and as far as 
we can tell, it has gone largely unnoticed by scholars.168 But its importance 
lies in its explicit suggestion, made within weeks after the Amendment’s 
rati+cation was announced, that the text applied fully to appellate cases 
arising under federal law. (Attorney General Lee rejected the plainti,s’ 
reading on other grounds, without mentioning the federal-question issue.169) 
That the Amendment’s application to federal questions was explicitly argued 
before the Justices gives particular relevance to the Court’s forceful 
declaration, the day after argument concluded, that “the amendment being 
constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any 
case, past or future, in which a state was sued by the citizens of another state, 
or by citizens, or subjects, of any foreign state.”170 
The Breckenridge proposal. In our view these two contemporaneous events 
solidly buttress the more natural reading, to show that the Eleventh 
 
166 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, ' U.S. (' Dall.) '&), '&) (*&#)) (arguments of counsel). 
167 Id. at ')" (citing Judiciary Act of *&)#, ch. (", §	(+, * Stat. &', )+). 
168 As of September (&, ("(", the Westlaw JLR database records not a single reference to a 
number of phrases from this passage, e.g., “suits brought hither by writ of error, or appeal,” or “sued 
originally, and yet not in the Supreme Court.” 
169 Hollingsworth, '&) U.S. at ')"-)( (argument of counsel). 
170 Id. at ')( (opinion of the Court). 
'#'"] "e Misunderstood Eleventh Amendment !($ 
Amendment originally meant an across-the-board denial of subject-matter 
jurisdiction in the cases it lists. Perhaps that’s all that need be said. Still, 
supporters and opponents of the diversity theory have taken hold of various 
nineteenth-century comments and events as secondary evidence. In our view, 
those subsequent events are at worst equivocal, and at best they lend 
additional support to the more natural reading. There’s some evidence of later 
interpreters who may have held the diversity view, though it’s far from clear. 
And this evidence is matched, if not bested, by evidence that others held the 
categorical view. 
One piece of pro-diversity evidence is the so-called Breckenridge Proposal. In 
December "&#%, the Kentucky legislature began a campaign to abolish diversity 
jurisdiction.171 Pennsylvania and Vermont’s legislatures eventually endorsed the 
idea, while Massachusetts and Rhode Island were opposed.172 In the meantime, in 
February "&#), Senator Breckenridge of Kentucky duly introduced a draft: 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
controversies between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens 
of di"erent States, between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under 
grants of di"erent States; and between a State or the citizens thereof and 
foreign States, citizens, or subjects.173 
The amendment was reintroduced during the next two years by Senators 
from Kentucky and Pennsylvania,174 though it doesn’t seem to have been 
debated. In any case, the wording of Breckenridge’s amendment tends to 
favor the diversity theory. As others have discussed, Breckenridge apparently 
believed that the phrase “shall not be construed to extend” would strike out 
particular heads of jurisdiction, rather than act as a cross-cutting prohibition 
applicable to all of Article III.175 
On the other hand, this episode has limited probative value about the 
Eleventh Amendment. On its own terms, the amendment never went 
anywhere. It’s hard to know how many people shared Breckenridge’s view of 
what his proposed language would accomplish. Indeed, his formulation wasn’t 
 
171 See Resolution of Dec. *#, *)"%, *)"% KY. ACTS *%&, *%). 
172 See *! ANNALS OF CONG. (*! (*)"!) (statement of Rep. Elliott) (reporting Vermont’s 
endorsement); *+ ANNALS OF CONG. )(!-(& (*)"+) (statement of Rep. Stanton) (reporting Rhode 
Island’s disagreement); Resolve of June *', *)"+, ch. (), *)"%–*)"+ MASS. ACTS !*(, !*%-*+ (calling 
the measure “inexpedient,” and noting Pennsylvania’s assent). 
173 *% ANNALS OF CONG. +' (*)"+). 
174 *! ANNALS OF CONG. &! (*)"&) (proposal by Sen. Clay) (Kentucky); *+ ANNALS OF 
CONG. !) (*)"!) (proposal by Sen. Maclay) (Pennsylvania). 
175 See Amar, Sovereignty, supra note %, at *%)( n.(''; Massey, supra note ', at **); Fletcher, 
Reply, supra note %, at *(&!-&#. But see Lee, supra note *%#, at *"&! (highlighting linguistic di-erences 
between the Eleventh Amendment and the Breckenridge amendment); Lawrence C. Marshall, 
Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, +& U. CHI. L. REV. *(&, *(#-'" (*##") (same). 
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universal, as the state legislative resolutions used di,erent language that had 
no implications for the Eleventh Amendment.176 
To be sure, one might say much the same of the Gallatin amendment: 
with little debate, competing interpretations are possible. But between the 
two of them, the Breckenridge amendment deserves less weight. While the 
Gallatin episode was a contemporaneous attempt to amend the Eleventh 
Amendment itself, the Breckenridge episode was a decade-later discussion of 
a di,erent proposal. However one resolves the uncertainty, it doesn’t carry 
much weight against other evidence from the text and the times. 
Judicial application. The Breckenridge episode was followed two decades 
later by a pair of cases in which the Supreme Court appeared to reject the 
diversity theory. The +rst of the two was the decision in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States.177 Osborn was a federal-question case, and controversially so; it 
remains famous today for the breadth of its holding on federal-question 
jurisdiction.178 Yet when Ralph Osborn (Ohio’s state auditor) argued that the 
suit against him was barred by the Eleventh Amendment,179 and when the 
Bank offered the diversity theory in response,180 the Court refused to adopt it. 
Indeed, as the arguments played out, the Court actually needed to reject 
the diversity theory for Osborn to lose—and it did so. Osborn argued to the 
Court that the suit violated the rules of joinder, which would have required 
the Bank to join the State of Ohio as a necessary party.181 The Court 
“admitted” the state’s “direct interest	.	.	.	in the suit, as brought,” and it 
reasoned that, “had it been in the power of the Bank to make [Ohio] a party, 
perhaps no decree ought to have been pronounced in the cause, until the	State 
was before the Court.”182 But, reasoned the Court, the Eleventh Amendment 
got in the way: it “was not in the power of the Bank”—whose membership 
 
176 See sources cited supra notes *&*–&%; see, e.g., *! ANNALS OF CONG. (*! (*)"!) (statement of Rep. 
Elliott) (reporting Vermont’s desire to confine “the judiciary power of the Courts of the United States to 
cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States,” and so on). 
177 (( U.S. (# Wheat.) &') (*)(%). The Court had also been presented a diversity-theory 
argument three years earlier in Cohens v. Virginia, and had neither rejected it nor adopted it, though 
it adopted multiple other theories of jurisdiction in the case. See *# U.S. (! Wheat.) (!%, '"+-"!, 
'*+, '%)-%# (*)(*) (arguments of counsel); id. at %"&-*( (opinion of the Court). 
178 See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, +& DUKE L.J. 
(!', (!!-!& ((""&). 
179 Osborn, (( U.S. at &+!, )"'-"% (argument of counsel). 
180 Id. at &#). 
181 Osborn’s counsel argued that 
[i]n all ordinary cases, if the Court sees from the face of the bill, that the actual and 
principal party in interest is not before them, it will either dismiss the bill, or stay the 
proceedings until proper parties are made. A decree, vitally a-ecting the interests of 
a principal, will never be pronounced, where his agent is the only party to the bill. 
Id. at &++-+!. 
182 Id. at )%!-%& (opinion of the Court). 
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included citizens of many di,erent states—to “make [Ohio] a party,” as “[t]he 
eleventh amendment of the constitution has exempted a State from the suits 
of citizens of other States, or aliens.”183 The state didn’t have to be joined 
because it couldn’t be joined, and because the case could proceed without it. 
And the reason the state couldn’t be joined was that the Eleventh Amendment 
limited the judicial power over states, even in what the Court famously 
decided was a federal-question case. 
This helps put a later passage of Osborn in context. The Court went on to 
resolve the case on the ground that the Amendment didn’t apply to personal 
suits against individual state o.cers, and that it was “limited to those suits in 
which a State is a party on the record.”184 In the next sentence, the Court 
added that “[t]he amendment has its full e,ect, if the constitution be 
construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the Court 
never been extended to suits brought against a State, by the citizens of 
another State, or by aliens.”185 This sentence has been taken to a.rm the 
diversity theory, but that seems less likely in context. First, the Court had 
already said that the Amendment prevented the state from being sued in this 
federal-question case. Second, sandwiched between references to a state’s 
“being a party on the record,”186 the Court appears to be trying to illustrate a 
distinction between the defendant Ralph Osborn and the State of Ohio. Just 
as Osborn couldn’t stand in for the state to establish jurisdiction under Article III, 
he also couldn’t stand in for the state to restrict jurisdiction under the Eleventh 
Amendment. If he could, of course, this federal-question suit would fail. 
Along with Osborn, the Court decided Bank of the United States v. Planters’ 
Bank of Georgia, in which the State of Georgia was one of the members 
composing the defendant corporation.187 At the time, under Bank of United 
States v. Deveaux, a federal civil suit involving corporations was understood 
to be a controversy between “the real persons who come into court, in this 
case, under their corporate name,” letting corporations sue or be sued in 
diversity if their members had the requisite citizenship.188 But because the 
Bank of the United States had shareholders from various states, and because 
Georgia held shares in the defendant, the Eleventh Amendment was 
 
183 Id.; see also id. at )*' (argument of counsel) (noting the diverse citizenship of the Bank’s membership). 
184 Id. at )+*-+&. The Court of course went on to resolve the case on the ground that the 
Amendment didn’t apply to personal suits against individual state o,cers, and that it was “limited 
to those suits in which a State is a party on the record.” Id. 
185 Id. at )+&-+). 
186 Id. at )+). 
187 (( U.S. (# Wheat.) #"%, #"+ (*)(%). 
188 # U.S. (+ Cranch) !*, #* (*)"#). 
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potentially implicated: the controversy was between a state and the citizens 
of another state, with the latter as plainti,s.189 
The Court found jurisdiction nonetheless. But it didn’t take what would 
have been the easy way out for a diversity theorist, holding the Eleventh 
Amendment inapplicable to a federal-question case (which the Bank’s cases 
always were, as the Court had just held in Osborn). Instead, the Court 
discussed at length the di,erences between a suit against a state and one 
against a corporation, considering the Planters’ Bank a separate legal person 
from the State of Georgia. A suit seeking relief against the bank alone, to be 
satis+ed from the bank’s property alone, was a suit “against a corporation,” 
not “against” the state: “The State does not, by becoming a corporator, 
identify itself with the corporation.”190 Thus, “[t]he Planters’ Bank of Georgia 
is not the State of Georgia” for Eleventh Amendment purposes191—just as 
the United States wasn’t an Article III “Party” to suits involving the First 
Bank of the United States, in which the federal government had held 
shares.192 The “Controvers[y]” at issue in Planters’ Bank may have been 
“between” the Bank’s shareholders and Georgia, but the “suit” wasn’t actually 
“against” Georgia. 
This may seem like slicing the baloney rather thin. Justice Johnson 
dissented in Planters’ Bank (as he had in Osborn), arguing that Georgia really 
was a party under Deveaux, which brought the case “strictly within the letter 
of the ""th amendment.”193 Yet still the Court failed to invoke the diversity 
theory, even to respond to Johnson’s dissent. Given that the case was argued 
together with Osborn, this seems to con+rm that Osborn didn’t endorse—and 
indeed rejected—the diversity theory of the Amendment. 
Planters’ Bank also undermines the diversity theory in a di,erent way. The 
Court’s understanding of the term “against” suggests that the Eleventh 
Amendment didn’t actually revise the state-diversity heads of jurisdiction, as 
the diversity theorists would have it. To see this, suppose that some private 
citizens had sued Planters’ Bank in diversity, with no federal questions 
involved. For Article III purposes, under Deveaux, the defendant would be 
made up of the State of Georgia and some individual corporators: the suit 
would be a “Controvers[y] .	.	. between a State and Citizens of another State,” 
as well as “between Citizens of di,erent States.”194 No common law 
immunity would apply, because compulsory process would issue only to the 
 
189 Planters’ Bank, (( U.S. at #"!. 
190 Id. at #"&. 
191 Id. 
192 See id. at #"); U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. * (addressing “Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party”). 
193 Id. at #*' (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
194 U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *. 
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corporation, not the state. And under Planters’ Bank, the Eleventh 
Amendment wouldn’t apply either, because Georgia wouldn’t be a party on 
the record, and so the suit wouldn’t be “against” the state. By contrast, if the 
diversity theorists were right, and if the Amendment had specifically revised the 
state-diversity provisions in Article III to exclude private plaintiffs, then there 
ought to be no jurisdiction: part of the controversy would be between private 
citizens and Georgia, and that part would fall outside Article III’s revised scope.195 
The discussion of the Eleventh Amendment in both cases is complex; 
perhaps not all of the Justices fully understood or endorsed the logic of Chief 
Justice Marshall’s opinions. At a minimum, however, these cases dispel any 
impression that the diversity theory was a widely-shared consensus reading 
of the Amendment in the early nineteenth century. 
The Madison letter. Finally, it’s worth noting one other reliable source who 
rejected the diversity theory: ex-President James Madison. Madison 
discussed the Amendment’s e,ect on federal questions in an "&'" letter to 
Spencer Roane.196 Madison was reacting to the Court’s recent decision in 
Cohens, which correctly held that a state-court defendant wasn’t prevented by 
state immunity from invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.197 While the facts of Cohens didn’t obviously implicate the 
Amendment, Chief Justice Marshall’s dicta about the common-law principle 
of immunity was inconsistent with much of what had been said at the 
founding, including by Marshall himself. For example, Marshall had argued 
in the Virginia rati+cation convention against the suability of states,198 but 
now he seemed to contend that Chisholm was correctly decided—and, more 
startlingly, that the states had consented to all federal-question suits by 
ratifying Article III.199 And he suggested that the collection of state debts, and 
not the “dignity of a state,” was the sole basis of the opposition to Chisholm200—
 
195 We don’t know what the Court would have made of such a suit. In the diversity case of Bank 
of Kentucky v. Wister, the state was the sole shareholder of the bank, but Deveaux’s application was 
complicated by a state statute under which “‘the president and directors’ alone constitute the body 
corporate, the metaphysical person liable to suit.” (& U.S. (( Pet.) '*), '(' (*)(#). Under modern 
doctrine, the question never arises: a corporation is taken to be an Article III citizen of its state of 
incorporation only (regardless of its shareholders), see Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. Co. 
v. Letson, %' U.S. (( How.) %#&, ++)-+# (*)%%), though Congress has seen $t to confer additional 
citizenships, see () U.S.C. §	*''((c). 
196 Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (May !, *)(*) [hereinafter Madison Letter], in 
( THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES '*& (David B. Mattern et al. eds., ("*'); 
see also Nelson, supra note **, at *!*! n.(+# (citing this source, though apparently unpersuaded by it). 
197 Cohens v. Virginia, *# U.S. (! Wheat.) (!%, %"+-"& (*)(*). 
198 See supra note '+ and accompanying text. 
199 See Cohens, *# U.S. at ')"-)'. 
200 Id. at %"!. 
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disregarding the widespread and furious arguments of the "*&#s and ‘$#s that 
states were generally not amenable to private suit or judicial coercion.201 
In response, Madison expressed disappointment that “the Court seems 
not to have adverted at all to the expository language held when the 
Constitution was adopted.”202 Back then, he and Marshall had both expected 
that the common-law immunity would survive Article III.203 So had 
Hamilton in The Federalist204—a work which the Cohens Court quoted, 
Madison thought, when doing so served its purposes, but not as carefully 
“when against the federal authority, as when agst. that of the States.”205 Nor 
had the Cohens Court paid enough attention to the nation’s open rejection of 
Chisholm: “[T]o the expository language	.	.	.	of the ""th. amendment[,] which 
may as well import that it was declaratory, as that it was restrictive of the 
meaning of the original text.”206 
In the next paragraph, Madison expressed his understanding of this language: 
The Judicial power of the U.S. over cases arising under the Constitution, must 
be admitted to be a vital part of the System. But that there are limitations and 
exceptions to its efficient character is among the admissions of the Court itself. 
The Eleventh amendment introduces exceptions if there were none before.207 
In other words, even if Article III had rendered the states amenable to 
federal-question suits, the Eleventh Amendment still deprived the federal 
courts of some portion of their judicial power to hear “cases arising under the 
Constitution,” not just diversity cases. 
On its own, a stray letter from an aging Founder proves little. But in 
combination with other evidence from this period, it confirms that there was 
no subsequent consensus in favor of the diversity reading, and a sizeable 
amount of evidence against it. This leads us to fall back on the natural meaning 
of the text and the contemporaneous evidence against the diversity theory. 
(. Purpose 
The core argument for the diversity theory is grounded in purpose. The 
theory gained force when it seemed to be the only candidate that could 
explain why the constitutional immunity might be limited to diverse plainti,s. 
If the Eleventh Amendment were the only game in town, why would it have 
 
201 See, e.g., Lash, supra note *', at *!'+-&!; Clark, supra note *(, at *)!(-&+, *))!-##. 
202 Madison Letter, supra note *#!, at '(". 
203 See supra note '+ and accompanying text. 
204 See THE FEDERALIST NO. )*, supra note '%, at %)&. 
205 Madison Letter, supra note *#!, at '*# & n.(. 
206 Id. at '(". 
207 Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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left in-state citizens free to sue their own states?208 If the problem posed by 
Chisholm were really the collection of state debts, couldn’t out-of-state 
bondholders have sold their debt claims to in-staters?209 The answer must 
have had something to do with the cause of action, and not merely the 
arrangement of the parties. If the debt claims arose under state law, not 
federal law, then the diversity theory would leave the bondholders with 
neither diversity nor federal-question jurisdiction, and the states would be 
secure. But if federal questions were involved, all bets were o,. 
That, however, is not how many prominent supporters of the Amendment 
understood what they were doing. As we read the evidence, their demands 
for an amendment weren’t calls for a sort of proto-Erie, protecting states 
against state-law claims that might be heard in federal court.210 Indeed, they 
don’t seem to have worried very much about the source of law in suits against 
states at all. At most, it was a secondary concern—assuming, “for argument[’]s 
sake,” that “an individual can sue a State” in the +rst place.211 The overriding 
concern expressed in the historical sources was that federal courts might call 
states to answer at the instance of private plainti,s, period—and that these 
courts might issue judgments against states, not individual o.cials, which 
would have to be collectively and coercively enforced.212 
Seeing the Eleventh Amendment against the backdrop of common-law 
sovereign immunity makes this understanding more plausible. Sovereign 
immunity wasn’t limited to state debts or to the citizens of other states; it 
extended to any suit against a state without its consent. The Eleventh 
Amendment was more limited as to parties, just as its limit on subject-matter 
jurisdiction was more categorical: it “cut o,” whatever part of the judicial 
 
208 See, e.g., Amar, Marbury, supra note %, at %##; Fletcher, Reply, supra note %, at *(&&-&), *()*-)(. But 
see Nelson, supra note **, at *!*+-*!, *!*! n.(+# (concluding that there’s “much to be said” for the diversity 
theory, despite also advocating the persistence of common-law sovereign immunity in same-state cases). 
209 See, e.g., Lycurgus, BOS. GAZETTE, Nov. *#, *&)&, reprinted in % DHRC, supra note '', at 
(&!, (&& (raising this possibility even before Rati$cation); To the Convention of Massachusetts, AM. 
HERALD (Bos.), Jan. *%, *&)), reprinted in + DHRC, supra note '', at &"#, &*( (same). 
210 See, e.g., Amar, Sovereignty, supra note %, at *%!#-&' (presenting such a view). But see generally Jay, 
supra note %" (identifying stark differences between post-Erie and Founding-era views of general law). 
211 A Republican, The Crisis, No. XIII, INDEP. CHRON. (Bos.), July (+, *&#', reprinted in + 
DHSC, supra note '!, at '#+, '#& (emphasis omitted); see also id. at '#+-#! (disparaging such a 
possibility); “Hampden,” INDEP. CHRON. (Bos.), July (+, *&#', reprinted in + DHSC, supra note '!, 
at '##, %""-"* (criticizing The Crisis for giving too much ground on this point); cf. Account of John 
Davis’s Speech in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, INDEP. CHRON. (Bos.), Sept. (', *&#', 
reprinted in + DHSC, supra note '!, at %'*, %'* (emphasizing federal limitations on state power, in 
the course of disagreeing with most of the Amendment’s supporters). 
212 See, e.g., Clark, supra note *(, at *))!-#" (discussing the “hostile” aftermath to Chisholm and 
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power might extend “to any suit” within its terms. This was rough justice, 
and it may have been overinclusive. But to the Amendment’s supporters, 
language that removed too many individual suits against states was better 
than language that removed too few. 
C. “to any suit”: Abrogation 
Congress can’t abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, most of the time. 
But since at least "$*!, the Supreme Court has held that “the Eleventh 
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are 
necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of [Section Five] of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”213 Once again, this statement con-ates a plausible 
account of the general law of sovereign immunity with an implausible account 
of the Eleventh Amendment’s text. 
Common-law doctrines can be abrogated by statute. But before that can 
happen, Congress needs authority to pass the statute. In general, there’s good 
reason to think that Congress lacks this abrogation power.214 It may well be 
that the Fourteenth Amendment is di,erent—that it provides a special kind 
of enumerated power, one with a greater ability to abrogate these common-
law doctrines.215 It may even be conceivable, as the Supreme Court has held, 
that some other clauses might do so as well.216 But none of these powers could 
have any e,ect on the Eleventh Amendment. 
The Amendment, as we’ve seen, is more than a restatement of the general 
law of sovereign immunity: it restricts the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, in “any suit in law or equity.”217 Even if Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had special force against common-law principles of 
sovereignty, that section makes no particular mention of the judicial power of 
the United States. So Section Five can’t plausibly be read as implicitly 
repealing the jurisdictional restrictions in the Eleventh Amendment, just as 
it can’t plausibly be read as implicitly repealing the Fifth Amendment 
requirement of due process, the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, or the 
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Otherwise 
Congress could “abrogate” all of these, demanding the torture and summary 
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execution of civil rights violators (and their families). More to the point, the 
Fourteenth Amendment can’t plausibly be read to let Congress dispense with 
other jurisdictional rules, allowing plainti,s to +le federal suits that fall 
outside the judicial power.218 The Eleventh Amendment, unlike the common 
law, can’t be abrogated by statute. 
That said, it isn’t clear how many Supreme Court cases actually turn on 
the point. The Court has recognized three successful instances of Fourteenth 
Amendment abrogation in the twenty-odd years since it set forth the current 
doctrine in Boerne v. Flores.219 But none of these obviously implicated the 
Eleventh Amendment. In the successful abrogation case of Tennessee v. Lane, 
the two named respondents, George Lane and Beverly Jones, were citizens of 
Tennessee.220 The suit permitted by the Court in Nevada Department of 
Human Resources v. Hibbs was brought by a resident of Nevada.221 And the 
suit allowed in Goodman v. Georgia was brought by a prisoner of the Georgia 
prison system who was likely a citizen of that state.222 
Earlier cases are a little muddier. In Fitzpatrick itself, the suit was brought 
against the State of Connecticut “on behalf of all present and retired male 
employees of the State.”223 Justice Brennan presumed the plainti,s to be 
Connecticut citizens, and thought this meant that the suit fell outside the 
Eleventh Amendment.224 But at least some people who retired from working 
in Connecticut might well have moved to warmer or cheaper places—a 
jurisdictional fact that the lower courts don’t seem to have discussed, perhaps 
because nobody realized it mattered. A couple of subsequent abrogation cases 
featured attorney’s fee awards to state prisoners or recipients of state 
bene+ts—who might well be state residents too, though again the Court 
failed to assure itself of this fact.225 
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The Court’s carelessness in Fourteenth Amendment cases infected its 
other abrogation decisions too. In Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 
it permitted a debtor’s action to discharge a debt owed to a state, on the 
argument that an in rem bankruptcy proceeding “does not implicate a State’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.”226 But the debtor in Hood was “a resident 
of Tennessee,” so the Amendment was inapplicable by its terms.227 The right 
question in the case was whether the bankruptcy court could issue compulsory 
process against the state, given its undisputed in rem jurisdiction over the 
debtor’s assets: the power to dispose of a private estate, denying a creditor 
state the right to bring a future claim, as plainti,,228 doesn’t confer any power 
to call a state to answer today, as a defendant.229 
In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court went further, 
holding that bankruptcy proceedings generally “operate[] free and clear of the 
State’s claim of sovereign immunity,”230 on the theory that the states had 
“agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert [their] immunity” in 
bankruptcy cases.231 But this was the wrong question. The right question in 
Katz was whether the Eleventh Amendment took the choice of waiving their 
immunity away from them. Bernard Katz hailed from New Jersey,232 so the 
federal courts were -atly forbidden by the Amendment from hearing any suit 
he +led against the State of Virginia, even to recover an allegedly preferential 
transfer. This result may not be “uniform,” in the language of the Bankruptcy 
Clause,233 but neither is the Eleventh Amendment: it carves out a particular 
exception to the federal judicial power, one that neither Congress nor the 
bankruptcy courts may evade. 
D. “in law or equity”: Admiralty Jurisdiction 
The Eleventh Amendment only applies to a “suit in law or equity.” That 
means that it exempts any proceeding other than a suit in law or equity—say, 
a case “of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”234 
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As mentioned above, leaving admiralty out of the Amendment made sense 
at the time. Admiralty typically works in rem, not in personam, so it usually 
poses no threat to the states’ personal immunity from compulsory process. 
Similar doctrines also stopped litigants from attaching state property, a 
prerequisite to a court’s in rem jurisdiction.235 Before the Constitution, for 
example, a Pennsylvania admiralty court had disclaimed jurisdiction over 
some sailors’ attempt to recover their lost wages by libeling a South Carolina 
ship, because “mariners enlisting on board a ship of war, or vessel belonging 
to a sovereign independent state, cannot libel against a ship for wages due.”236 
In "&"', the U.S. Supreme Court con+rmed a similar common-law immunity 
for foreign nations in federal court.237 0e exact boundaries of this immunity 
were and are disputed—does it extend to all sovereign-owned property, or 
only to certain sovereign uses?238 But as this in rem immunity was 
unthreatened by Chisholm, there was less need for the Eleventh Amendment 
to supplement it. 0us, in admiralty suits, even if +led in personam, only the 
common-law immunity applies. 
The Court wiggled its way to more or less this resolution in Ex parte New 
York, a twentieth-century admiralty suit brought against two city-chartered 
tugboats.239 The Court’s opinion began with a near-con-ation of the Eleventh 
Amendment and the unwritten general-law immunity—describing the latter 
as a “fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exempli+cation.”240 
But the Court then got to the right place, concluding that the case was 
controlled by the general-law principle of “immunity of a State from suit in 
personam in the admiralty brought by a private person without its consent.”241 
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The general law, not the more unforgiving rule of the Eleventh Amendment, 
controls admiralty cases. 
Understanding the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment and 
admiralty gives us additional reason to be careful about the scope of admiralty 
jurisdiction. Admiralty’s reach has expanded quite a bit over time. The Taney 
Court held that the doctrine had been expanded from the “ebb and -ow of 
the tide” (as it was in England) to include all “navigable waters” (such as 
America’s Great Lakes).242 Modern doctrine extends it even to some injuries 
on land, if they were originally caused by a vessel on navigable waters (such 
as the -ooding of a skyscraper in the Chicago Loop, caused by pilings inserted 
by a crane that sat on a river barge).243 Those expansions a,ect federal judicial 
power generally, but they also a,ect power over states speci+cally. A broader 
scope for admiralty means a broader range of cases to which the Eleventh 
Amendment is inapplicable. If those expansions were inconsistent with 
constitutional principles,244 a question on which we take no position here, the 
Amendment cautions us to be even more chary of them. 
E. “commenced or prosecuted”: Appellate jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court may occupy a special place in our constitutional 
system, but the Court isn’t above the law. Rather, it’s bound by the same 
principles that bind the other federal courts, which equally exercise “the 
judicial Power of the United States.”245 The Eleventh Amendment restricts 
that “Judicial power” by preventing any federal court from hearing any case, 
in law or equity, “commenced or prosecuted” against one state by the citizens 
of another.246 But because the Supreme Court, by statute, is the only one that 
hears cases on appeal from state courts, it has gotten rather confused about 
the scope of its authority. 
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". Text and History 
The Supreme Court can exercise two forms of jurisdiction: “original” and 
“appellate.”247 Its original jurisdiction is limited to cases “a,ecting 
Ambassadors” and other diplomats, as well as “those in which a State shall be 
Party”; its appellate jurisdiction includes “the other Cases before mentioned” 
in the +rst clause of Article III, Section Two.248 As a result, the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction is a strict subset of “[t]he judicial Power” described in 
Section Two249—precisely the power limited by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Whether the Court can hear a state-court appeal thus turns on whether 
the appeal falls within the Amendment’s terms. Chief Justice Marshall +rst 
confronted this problem in Cohens. As noted above, the case involved an 
appeal from a state criminal prosecution: two brothers had been prosecuted 
in Virginia court for a violation of Virginia law (the illegal sale of D.C. lottery 
tickets).250 The state court upheld the defendants’ conviction, and the 
defendants sought a writ of error in the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
Virginia law was preempted by federal statute. 
The Supreme Court correctly determined that the Eleventh Amendment 
didn’t create any problems for its jurisdiction. The Amendment only applies 
to a suit “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.”251 As 
the Court elaborated, “[t]o commence a suit, is to demand something by the 
institution of process in a Court of justice, and to prosecute the suit, is, 
according to the common acceptation of language, to continue that 
demand.”252 Thus, “[w]hatever may be the stages of its progress, the actor is 
still the same.”253 On appeal, then, everything depends on how the parties 
had been arranged below, and which ones were asking the courts for relief. In 
Cohens, the plainti, was the state, so the Amendment didn’t apply.254 And 
because Virginia wasn’t the original target of compulsory process, the common-
law immunity didn’t apply either: private defendants had routinely sought writs 
of error after the United States prevailed against them below, and no one 
thought this infringed the federal government’s common-law immunity.255 
What happens when an individual is the one who originally brought the 
suit? If an in-state plaintiff sues a state in its own courts, the Eleventh 
Amendment is of course out of the picture, and the suit proceeds if and only 
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if the state lets it. Should a federal issue arise, the case might well be appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The Amendment doesn’t bar federal jurisdiction over 
suits by in-staters, and no new compulsory process would be needed on appeal. 
When the plainti, is from out of state, however, the Eleventh 
Amendment prevents federal courts from taking any jurisdiction over that 
suit. A state’s own courts might be able to hear the case; they aren’t bound by 
the Eleventh Amendment. But under the Cohens logic, it’s plain what should 
happen next: nothing. The case should be heard in the state court system, and 
then stop. The Supreme Court is forbidden to review it. Just as Cohens 
retained its defensive character when it reached the Supreme Court, these 
suits retain their o,ensive character when they reach the Supreme Court—as 
suits “commenced or prosecuted against” the state, with an out-of-stater as 
plainti,. It follows that “the judicial power of the United States” doesn’t reach 
these suits, and so the Supreme Court can’t hear them. 
'. Precedent 
In practice, however, the Court has said and done otherwise. It has 
granted review of state-court cases +led against states by out-of-state 
plainti,s with little apparent concern for the Eleventh Amendment. In at 
least some of these cases, it seems likely that the Amendment barred the 
appeal.256 As Professor Vicki Jackson observed in "$&&, Cohens has become 
“popularly cited for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does not 
preclude Supreme Court review of state court judgments, whether in favor of 
or against the state as a formal party.”257 But this popular view is wrong. As 
noted above, Cohens requires something else. 
The Supreme Court didn’t fully confront this problem until its "$$# 
decision in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, a 
Commerce Clause challenge to Florida’s liquor taxes.258 The case was brought 
against Florida in state court under the state’s own tax refund statute, and the 
state supreme court decided the case unimpeded by the Eleventh 
Amendment. But when the taxpayer sought review in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the state argued that the case was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment,259 which indeed it seemed to be. The suit was commenced by 
an out-of-state corporation against the state;260 it thus fell outside of the 
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“judicial power of the United States,” and a fortiori outside of the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. 
The Court’s reasons for hearing the case anyway can be disaggregated 
into three: 
Consent. Florida had allowed the suit to proceed in its own courts. This 
meant, the Court suggested, that “the State assents to appellate review by this 
Court of the federal issues raised in the case.”261 As noted above, that’s not 
quite right. Whether or not allowing a suit in state court waives the common-
law immunity from process in federal court, the common-law immunity isn’t 
the one at issue. The Eleventh Amendment, as we have seen, is a restriction 
on subject-matter jurisdiction—and that can’t be bestowed by consent.262 
The Constitutional Plan. Alternatively, o,ered the Court, its jurisdiction 
was “inherent in the constitutional plan.”263 The Court noted, correctly, that 
it may review cases arising from state courts, a principle established as long 
ago as Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.264 And it concluded, without much evidence, 
that this review wasn’t just a power but a universal condition: 
To secure state-court compliance with, and national uniformity of, federal 
law, the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over cases encompassing 
issues of federal law is subject to two conditions: State courts must interpret 
and enforce faithfully the “supreme Law of the Land,” and their decisions 
are subject to review by this Court.265 
Again, the Court’s logic is faulty on its own terms. If appellate review is 
available most of the time, then we can enjoy a good deal of uniformity 
without demanding that state judgments be subject to review in every case. 
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that other jurisdictional bars, such as the 
adequate-and-independent-state-ground rule, sometimes preclude its review 
of state decisions about federal law.266 So it was far from clear why the 
Eleventh Amendment was so contrary to the constitutional plan. 
More fundamentally, though, the Court’s opinion re-ected the most 
nefarious form of structural reasoning, inferring a “constitutional plan” apart 
from any actual provisions in the Constitution or any actual plans of those 
who enacted it. The Eleventh Amendment is a part of the constitutional plan. 
Indeed, it was enacted by those dissatis+ed with a previous reading of the 
constitutional plan, who insisted on changing the constitutional plan to (what 
they thought was) a better plan. And within weeks of the announcement of 
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rati+cation, lawyers suggested that the Amendment applied to cases brought 
to the Supreme Court on appeal from state courts.267 To reject the 
straightforward reading of a constitutional amendment because of one’s own 
view of a supposedly paramount “plan” is to make great mischief, and also to 
nullify the power of the people to make their own law. 
Practice. That left the fact that most favored the Court, which is that 
“consistent practice” seemed to favor the exercise of jurisdiction: 
We have repeatedly and without question accepted jurisdiction to review 
issues of federal law arising in suits brought against States in state court; 
indeed, we frequently have entertained cases analogous to this one, where a 
taxpayer who had brought a refund action in state court against the State asked 
us to reverse an adverse state judicial decision premised upon federal law.268 
Here, too, the Court overclaimed. There was no judicial holding to cite. 
The Court’s opinion in Cohens provided no support. The two reasoned 
opinions the Court could cite were a "$#& concurrence by Justice Harlan and 
an "&(* dissent by Justice Story, both of which assumed that Cohens settled 
the issue.269 What’s more, these weren’t even Eleventh Amendment cases. 
The "$#& case, General Oil v. Crain, was a suit by a Tennessee corporation in 
Tennessee court against a Tennessee oil inspector;270 the "&(* case, Proprietors 
of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, was a suit between 
two Massachusetts corporations.271 
True, the Court had heard some appeals that were in fact forbidden by 
the Eleventh Amendment. But the Court usually places little stock in “drive-
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by jurisdictional rulings.”272 In any case, its count was wrong. McKesson string-
cited twenty-two cases. Of these, only eight would normally be taken to 
trigger the Eleventh Amendment: seven involved foreign corporations,273 and 
one, Nevada v. Hall, involved California residents suing the State of 
Nevada.274 The others involved in-state corporations or residents, or other 
entities such as a Native American tribe or a federal savings-and-loan.275 In 
rejecting the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court still 
merrily con-ated in-state and out-of-state plainti,s. 
Judge John Gibbons and others have made a similar mistake in citing the 
Marshall Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia as supporting federal 
jurisdiction over these appeals.276 Gibbons finds it “especially telling” that 
“[i]n Worcester v. Georgia the party alignment was exactly that proscribed by 
the eleventh amendment, but the Court found no eleventh amendment bar to 
the issuance of a writ of error; indeed, it did not even discuss the issue.”277 But 
again, this critique demonstrates inattention to the Eleventh Amendment’s 
text. The suit had been commenced when the State of Georgia prosecuted 
Worcester for a violation of Georgia law, sentencing him “to hard labour, in 
the penitentiary, for the term of four years.”278 Worcester appealed his criminal 
conviction.279 Under the Cohens rule, the Eleventh Amendment was 
inapplicable because Georgia, not Worcester, had “commenced or prosecuted” 
the suit. Little wonder that the Court didn’t discuss the Eleventh Amendment. 
Putting aside such overstatements of the historical record, it’s still true 
that before McKesson the Court sometimes exercised a jurisdiction forbidden 
by the Eleventh Amendment. But without any reasoning, and in con-ict with 
the Amendment itself, these exercises should have been grounds for 
 
272 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, +(' U.S. )', #* (*##)); accord Arbaugh v. Y & H 
Corp., +%! U.S. +"", +** ((""!). 
273 See Tyler Pipe, %)' U.S. at ('( (identifying appellant as “an out-of-state manufacturer”); 
Exxon, %!( U.S. at *&# n.( (noting that appellants included Louisiana and California corporations); 
Brief for Petitioners (cover), Bonelli, %*% U.S. %*' (No. &(-'#&) (“Bonelli Cattle Company, a 
California corporation”); Halliburton, '&' U.S. at !! (concerning an Oklahoma corporation’s oil 
production in Louisiana); Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, '%( U.S. at ')# (identifying appellant as 
“a foreign corporation operating	.	.	.	in Tennessee”); Best & Co., '** U.S. at %+%-++ (describing 
Appellant as a New York establishment bringing suit against North Carolina); Int’l Paper, (%! U.S. 
at *')-'# (noting that the suit was brought by a New York corporation against Massachusetts). 
274 %%" U.S. %*", %** (*#&#), overruled by Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, *'# S.	Ct. *%)+ (("*#). 
275 This discussion assumes, perhaps contrary to fact, the correctness of modern doctrines on 
corporate citizenship. See supra notes *"!, *#+. 
276 Gibbons, supra note %, at *#+'-+% (citing Worcester v. Georgia, '* U.S. (! Pet.) +*+ (*)'()); 
see also Lee, supra note *%#, at *"&' (making the same mistake). Gibbons makes the argument as a 
point in favor of the diversity theory, in an article that predates McKesson. 
277 Gibbons, supra note %, at *#+' (footnote omitted). 
278 Worcester, '* U.S. at +'&-%". 
279 Id. at +*+. 
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embarrassment and apology by the Court, not for embracing the error and 
repeating it out loud. 
Less than a decade after McKesson, another state tried to sway the Court 
in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama.280 Again the plainti,s were out-
of-state corporations who had sued the state under the Commerce Clause in 
state court.281 Again the plainti,s appealed to the Supreme Court, and again 
the state pointed out “that th[e] Amendment’s literal language applies 
here.”282 But the Court simply responded that it had “recently considered and 
rejected the very argument that the State now makes”; that McKesson 
“con+rmed a long-established and uniform practice”; and that there was no 
“convincing reason why we should revisit that relatively recent precedent.”283 
So much for the Constitution. 
McKesson and South Central Bell Telephone may have been entangled with 
the broader sovereign immunity debates aired in Seminole Tribe and 
subsequent cases. Justice Brennan, the author of McKesson, was no fan of 
sovereign immunity, and he was especially committed to the Supreme Court’s 
ability to police state misconstructions of federal rights.284 Yet Justice Souter, 
in his subsequent dissent in Seminole Tribe, correctly called McKesson’s rule 
“specious” and declared that it “makes no sense.”285 This wasn’t because Justice 
Souter disagreed with the result: he thought it axiomatic that the Court must 
have power to review state-court holdings on federal law, and if McKesson 
wasn’t the reason why, then the diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment 
must be.286 In any event, these statements made it plausible for Alabama 
(represented by Chuck Cooper and now-Judge William Pryor287) to think that 
the issue could be reconsidered in "$$$. Five Justices had expanded sovereign 
immunity in Seminole Tribe; the other four had stated explicitly that 
 
280 +(! U.S. *!" (*###). 
281 Id. at *!", *!(-!'. 
282 Id. at *!+. The petitioners replied that even if McKesson were overruled, the tax refund claim 
at issue was “not a suit against the State.” Reply Brief for Petitioners at *', S. Cent. Bell Tel., +(! U.S. 
*!" (No. #&-("%+) (quoting State v. Norman Tobacco Co., (&' Ala. %(", %(* (*#!()). 
283 S. Cent. Bell Tel., +(! U.S. at *!! (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, +"+ U.S. 
)'', )+%-++ (*##()). 
284 Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, !* TEMP. L. REV. '"&, 
'(*-(( (*#))); Robert C. Post, Remembering Justice Brennan: A Eulogy, '& WASHBURN L.J., at xix, 
xix-xx (*##&). 
285 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, +*& U.S. %%, **' n.*" (*##!) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
286 Id. at **'-*%; see also Gibbons, supra note %, at *#+'-++ (taking a similar view); Jackson, supra 
note %, at (+-'# (describing the thin historical rationales for Supreme Court review of controversies 
that cannot otherwise be decided by federal courts); Nelson, supra note **, at *!(+ n.()& (arguing 
that McKesson re.ects “[t]he Supreme Court’s tacit acceptance of the ‘diversity’ reading of the 
Eleventh Amendment”). 
287 S. Cent. Bell Tel., +(! U.S. at *!(. 
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McKesson’s rule made no sense.288 The court’s unanimous refusal to rethink 
the question papered all this over. 
One might have hoped that twenty years after South Central Bell Telephone, 
the Court would +nally be prepared to come to terms with its mistake, or at 
least to o,er a better explanation. The issue was gamely raised by amici in 
Hyatt,289 but alas, the Court declined to discuss it at all. 
F. “against one of the United States”: Defendants 
Sovereign immunity is for sovereigns, and the Eleventh Amendment is 
for states speci+cally. In identifying the parties whom the Amendment 
protects, the Supreme Court has gotten things mostly right—but with no 
shortage of confusing terminology that may lead others astray. 
On the same day that it decided Hans v. Louisiana, the Court also decided 
Lincoln County v. Luning,290 another collection of suits by disappointed 
bondholders. Lincoln County exercised governmental authority in the state 
of Nevada, so the county argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the 
suit.291 Indeed, the plainti,s were citizens of California and Germany,292 so 
in some sense the case seemed easier than Hans; the plainti,s were actually 
from another state! But the Supreme Court rightly found the Eleventh 
Amendment inapplicable, for a simple and textually sensible reason. “The 
Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits against a 
State,”293 and counties aren’t states.294 
By the same logic, and even more obviously, the Eleventh Amendment 
extends no protection to Indian tribes. Tribes may well have, as current doctrine 
holds, a form of common-law immunity that counties lack.295 But they haven’t 
 
288 See Seminole Tribe, +*& U.S. at *"" (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Justices Ginsburg 
and Breyer had joined his opinion); id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that he dissented for his 
own reasons “as well as those set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion”). 
289 Namely, us. See Hyatt Brief, supra note *", at ''-'%. 
290 *'' U.S. +(#, +'" (*)#"). 
291 Id. at +'"-'*. 
292 Vincent v. Lincoln Cnty., '" F. &%#, &%# (C.C.D. Nev. *))&). 
293 Luning, *'' U.S. at +'". 
294 To be sure, there are a range of more complicated questions about when a suit against a 
nonstate entity is really against a state. Is the test the party on the record, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of 
the U.S., (( U.S. (# Wheat.) &'), )')-%(, )+&-+) (*)(%), the real party in interest, e.g., Ex parte Ayers, 
*(' U.S. %%', %)) (*))&), or the legal capacity of the entity under state law, e.g., Workman v. New 
York City, *&# U.S. ++(, +!+ (*#""); P.R. Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, +'* F.'d )!), ))*-)( 
(D.C. Cir. ("")) (Williams, J., concurring)? These questions may well apply equally, or similarly, to 
the common-law rules of sovereign immunity and to the Eleventh Amendment’s reference to “one 
of the United States.” As above, one of us may address them in future work. See supra note !#. 
295 Compare United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., '"# U.S. +"!, +*( (*#%") (“These Indian 
Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional authorization.”), with Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. 
Mfg. Techs., Inc., +(' U.S. &+*, &+! (*##)) (“Though the doctrine of tribal immunity is settled law 
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been held to fall within the Eleventh Amendment, and for good reason. As 
Chief Justice Marshall confirmed with respect to Article III in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, a tribe isn’t “a state of the union.” 296 By the same logic, it can’t be 
“one of the United States” to which the Eleventh Amendment applies.297 
Federal territories have created slightly more confusion. The Supreme 
Court, per Justice Holmes, attributed sovereign immunity to the then-
Territory of Hawaii, “not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, 
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as 
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”298 We 
have doubts about this reasoning, which appears to con-ate immunity with 
the merits.299 But whether the result was right or wrong obviously depends 
on the scope of the common-law immunity, not the Eleventh Amendment, 
for territories also aren’t states. Still, some courts can be found saying (for 
example) that “Puerto Rico, despite the lack of formal statehood, enjoys the 
shelter of the Eleventh Amendment in all respects.”300 This is wrong; for all 
its virtues, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico currently isn’t “one of the 
United States,”301 and so any immunity it might possess must come from 
some other source.302 Courts confronting claims by Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, by contrast, have gotten at least that much right.303 
 
and controls this case, we note that it developed almost by accident.”). See also Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., +&( U.S. &)(, )"% (("*%) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing that tribal immunity is 
deeply rooted). 
296 '" U.S. (+ Pet.) *, *! (*)'*). Nor, for that matter, is it “a foreign state in the sense of the 
constitution”—the more important holding of the case. Id. 
297 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
298 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, ("+ U.S. '%#, '+' (*#"&). 
299 See, e.g., id. (“A suit presupposes that the defendants are subject to the law invoked.”); cf. 
Territory of Wisconsin v. Doty, * Pin. '#!, %"!-"& (Wis. Terr. July *)%%) (simultaneously and 
contradictorily characterizing the territory as “a municipal corporation” and “a sovereignty	.	.	.	entitled 
to the same immunities” and “a part of the United States”). 
300 Ramirez v. P.R. Fire Serv., &*+ F.(d !#%, !#& (*st Cir. *#)'); accord Torres-Álamo v. Puerto 
Rico, +"( F.'d (", (% (*st Cir. (""&); Acevedo López v. Police Dep’t, (%& F.'d (!, () (*st Cir. (""*); 
De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, #'* F.(d **!, *(* (*st Cir. *##*); see also Adam D. 
Chandler, Comment, Puerto Rico’s Eleventh Amendment Status Anxiety, *(" YALE L.J. (*)', (*)%-)+, 
(*))-)# (("**). 
301 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
302 See, e.g., Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, ((& U.S. (&", (&% (*#*') (following Kawananakoa 
to $nd common-law immunity). The D.C. Circuit has attributed Puerto Rico’s sovereign immunity, 
at least from federal statutory claims, to %) U.S.C. §	&'%, which provides that “[t]he statutory laws 
of the United States not locally inapplicable	.	.	.	shall have the same force and e-ect in Puerto Rico 
as in the United States.” §	&'%; see Rodriguez v. P.R. Fed. A-s. Admin., %'+ F.'d '&), ')*-)( (D.C. 
Cir. (""!). 
303 E.g., Paeste v. Gov’t of Guam, &#) F.'d *((), *('% (#th Cir. ("*+) (Guam); Fleming v. Dep’t 
of Pub. Safety, )'& F.(d %"*, %"+ (#th Cir. *#))) (Northern Mariana Islands). 
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On the other hand, when it comes to multistate entities created by 
interstate compacts,304 the Court’s caselaw is hopelessly lost. Constitutionally 
neither +sh nor fowl, a Compact Clause entity can’t claim to be part of any 
one of its member state governments. So a suit against the entity can’t be 
“against one of the United States,” as the Eleventh Amendment requires—
even if, as in Planters’ Bank, the controversy might be “between” the plainti,s 
and the member states.305 Nonetheless, the Court in Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency306 and Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson 
Corp.307 kludged together a di,erent test: one that focuses on whether the 
member states wanted the entity to share in their immunity,308 or (when all 
else fails) on the threat posed to state dignity and state treasuries.309 Maybe 
these factors might be relevant to the scope of the common-law immunity, or 
to distinguishing bodies within a state’s government from independent 
municipal corporations (as in Luning). But on their own, these policy interests 
can’t expand the terms of the Eleventh Amendment, whose coverage isn’t for 
states to confer. 
G. “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State”: Plaintiffs 
The other side of the “v.” presents a similar need for precision in a range 
of more complicated circumstances. 
Assignments. Consider +rst the relatively obscure sovereign-immunity 
dispute decided in New Hampshire v. Louisiana.310 In an e,ort to help its 
citizens collect on their Louisiana bonds (a recurring theme), the State of 
New Hampshire by statute let citizens assign their bonds to the state, which 
would then sue to enforce the bonds and return the proceeds.311 By having 
New Hampshire bring the suits in its own name, the idea went, the 
bondholders could sidestep sovereign immunity as well as the Eleventh 
Amendment. 
The Court didn’t buy it. But it took the hard way out. It insisted that the 
claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, even though the Amendment 
refers only to suits by “citizens” and “subjects,” not by states themselves. It 
squeezed the state’s suit into the Amendment’s text by holding that it had 
 
304 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, §	*", cl. ' (requiring congressional consent for such compacts). 
305 See supra notes *#%–#+ and accompanying text (explaining why a suit against a bank in which 
Georgia held shares did not implicate the Eleventh Amendment). 
306 %%" U.S. '#* (*#&#). 
307 +*' U.S. '" (*##%). 
308 Id. at %'-%% (citing Lake Country Estates, %%" U.S. at %"*). 
309 Id. at '#-%", %&-%). 
310 *") U.S. &! (*))'). 
311 Id. at &!-&). The state of New York passed a similar one. Id. at &)-&#. 
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been truly “commenced” and “prosecuted” by New Hampshire citizens: “No 
one can look at the pleadings and testimony in these cases without being 
satis+ed, beyond all doubt, that they were in legal e,ect commenced, and are 
now prosecuted, solely by the owners of the bonds and coupons.”312 
That wasn’t actually free from doubt. True, as the Court pointed out, the 
bondholder deposited money to start the case, paid for the case, got the 
money back at the end, and could veto settlements.313 But on the other hand, 
the attorney general was to rely on his own “opinion” as to whether there was 
“a valid claim” and whether it “shall be just and equitable to enforce” it, and 
the statute said the attorney general would “prosecute such action or actions to 
+nal judgment.”314 Indeed, the Court itself later described the states as 
“assuming the prosecution of debts.”315 
It would have been more straightforward to acknowledge that this was a 
case to which the Eleventh Amendment failed to apply, but that was instead 
governed by the common law. Perhaps those common-law principles would 
still have a,orded reason to bar the suit—for instance, by analogy to the 
statutory rules against manipulation of federal jurisdiction,316 or by analogy 
to principles of international law that the Court discussed in its opinion.317 
The Eleventh Amendment didn’t supplant these common-law rules; it simply 
declared that such suits, whether permitted by the common law or not, 
couldn’t be brought in federal court by the citizens of another state. 
Foreign states. As noted earlier, the Court handled this relationship more 
precisely in Monaco v. Mississippi—yet another strategic bond collection suit, 
 
312 Id. at )#. 
313 Id. In a subsequent case where the bonds were an outright gift to the state, the Court 
allowed the suit, South Dakota v. North Carolina, *#( U.S. ()!, '*", '(* (*#"%), even though the 
purpose of the gift may have been to make money o- of the state’s successful suit. See ' J.G. DE 
ROULHAC HAMILTON, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA '(!-'" (*#*#) (describing scheme by 
the “Carlisle syndicate” to collect and sell repudiated bonds to other states); see also South Dakota, 
*#( U.S. at '*" (“[S]uch action might enure to his bene$t as the owner of other like bonds. But the 
motive with which a gift is made, whether good or bad, does not a-ect its validity or the question 
of jurisdiction.”). 
314 New Hampshire, *") U.S. at && (emphasis added). Again, the New York statute was similar. Id. at &#. 
315 Id. at #*. 
316 Indeed, had the case been $led in a lower federal court rather than in the Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction, it could have been blocked by the anti-assignment statute: 
[N]or shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any suit founded on contract 
in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to 
recover thereon if no assignment had been made, except in cases of promissory notes 
negotiable by the law merchant and bills of exchange. 
Act of Mar. ', *)&+, ch. *'&, §	*, *) Stat. %&"; see also Farmington v. Pillsbury, **% U.S. *'), *%*-%+ 
(*))+) (interpreting this statute); Comment, Manufactured Diversity, **& U. PA. L. REV. &+*, &+*-+% 
(*#!#) (tracing this and similar provisions). 
317 New Hampshire, *") U.S. at #*. 
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this time brought by a foreign state.318 Since the foreign state wasn’t a 
“Citizen[] or Subject[]” of itself, the Court rightly accepted that the Eleventh 
Amendment didn’t apply. Yet it also recognized that this failed to exhaust the 
inquiry. After all, the Court noted, the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity wasn’t mentioned in the Eleventh Amendment (or anywhere else 
in the Constitution), and yet it existed. The same was true for a state’s 
common-law immunity against plainti,s not named in the Amendment, such 
as in-staters or foreign states.319 
Federal corporations. A trickier question is posed by federally chartered 
corporations, such as the federal railroad thrown out of court in Smith v. 
Reeves,320 or the suits by the Bank of the United States discussed above. 
Whether these plainti,s are bound by the Eleventh Amendment depends on 
the nature of corporate citizenship. 
When considering this question for diversity purposes, the Supreme 
Court +rst held in Deveaux that a corporation’s citizenship is determined by 
the citizenship of its members (often understood as its shareholders).321 It 
later changed course, holding in Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad 
Co. v. Letson that a state-created corporation is always and only a citizen of 
the state by which it was incorporated.322 
Presumably the same principles apply to the Eleventh Amendment, which 
also makes the federal judicial power depend on the parties’ citizenship. If so, 
then jurisdiction over suits by corporations against states will depend on 
which of these principles is correct. If jurisdiction is based on the 
shareholders’ citizenship, per Deveaux, then a suit by a corporation against a 
state runs into the Eleventh Amendment whenever there are out-of-state 
shareholders. If jurisdiction is based on the state of incorporation, per 
Letson—and if federal corporations, not having been incorporated by any 
state, aren’t citizens of any state—then federal corporations fall outside of the 
Eleventh Amendment entirely, facing only the common-law immunity. 
Indian tribes. An extension of this problem is posed by Indian tribes as 
plainti,s. A tribe is recognized as a sovereign, not a mere corporation, so it’s 
implausible to view it merely as an agglomeration of its own tribal members—
and also implausible to view it as the citizen of any particular state. So suits 
by tribes aren’t bound by the Eleventh Amendment. But, like the Principality 
of Monaco, that doesn’t exempt them from the common-law principles of 
 
318 (#( U.S. '*', '("-(* (*#'%). The strategy seemed especially viable after South Dakota v. 
North Carolina, discussed supra note '*'. 
319 Monaco, (#(. U.S. at '(*; see also supra notes +%–+) and accompanying text. 
320 *&) U.S. %'!, %%! (*#"") (relying on Hans v. Louisiana rather than the Eleventh Amendment). 
321 Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, # U.S. (+ Cranch) !*, #*-#( (*)"#); see, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. 
Friend, ++# U.S. &&, )% (("*") (describing the members as shareholders). 
322 %' U.S. (( How.) %#&, ++) (*)%%) (overruling Deveaux). 
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immunity, which (according to the Court) protect against suits by foreign 
states just as much as by domestic tribes.323 
Compact Clause entities. Another extension is posed by Compact Clause 
entities as plainti,s. In Alabama v. North Carolina, for instance, Chief Justice 
Roberts objected to letting the Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Management Commission tag along as a plainti, in an original action among 
states, partly because of the Eleventh Amendment.324 This may be right as a 
matter of Article III, which “does not countenance such ‘no harm, no foul’ 
jurisdiction”;325 but the Amendment probably doesn’t decide the issue. If the 
Letson principle applies, and congressional consent under the Compact Clause 
creates a separate, stateless entity, then the suit falls outside the Eleventh 
Amendment (and, indeed, outside the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction). 
If the Deveaux principle applies, and the Compact Clause entity is really just 
an agglomeration of states, then the suit also falls outside the Eleventh 
Amendment. (Under that view, the suit would be outside the common-law 
principles of sovereign immunity too, though other barriers might apply.326) 
In any event, the Eleventh Amendment seems the wrong place to look.327 
CONCLUSION 
The picture we’ve proposed is simple, if somewhat counterintuitive. 
There are two overlapping principles of sovereign immunity. One is a 
common-law principle against forcing states into court without their consent. 
The other is the Eleventh Amendment’s cross-cutting restriction on subject-
matter jurisdiction, which can’t be waived, abrogated, or ignored. 
 
323 See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, +"* U.S. &&+, &)"-)( (*##*) (relying on Monaco v. 
Mississippi). As to whether the Court was correct in interpreting the common-law immunity to apply 
to sovereign suits, we aren’t sure. See id. at &)" (acknowledging that the tribe’s “conception of the 
nature of sovereign immunity $nds some support both in the apparent understanding of the 
Founders and in dicta of our own opinions”). 
324 +!" U.S. ''", '!"-!* (("*") (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
325 Id. at '!". 
326 Because North Carolina was both the defendant and a member of the compact, this view 
would raise tricky questions about a state’s ability to sue itself in federal court, cf. Va. O-. for Prot. 
& Advoc. v. Stewart, +!' U.S. (%&, (+# (("**); id. at (&"-&( (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and whether 
the jurisdiction over “Controversies between two or more States,” U.S. CONST. art. III, §	(, cl. *, 
requires minimal or complete diversity—questions that the Court hasn’t yet had to confront, because 
it currently adheres to the Letson principle. 
327 A true tag-along Eleventh Amendment issue was brie.y raised in ("(" by President 
Trump’s motion to intervene in an original action: his intervention would have pit Texas and a 
Florida citizen against Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Motion of Donald J. 
Trump, President of the U.S., to Intervene in His Pers. Capacity as Candidate for Re-Election, 
Texas v. Pennsylvania, No. ((O*++ (U.S. Dec. **, ("("), ("(" WL &(!'(%!. But the issue was mooted 
when the Court denied leave to $le a bill of complaint. Texas, No. ((O*++, ("(" WL &(#!)*%. 
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We acknowledge that at least two of these features might be hard to 
swallow. Why would the Amendment’s drafters have carefully left out suits 
by citizens of the same state, if they expected those suits to be barred by other 
principles of sovereign immunity anyway? And why would the drafters have 
chosen to entrench a constitutional immunity that was so in-exible and 
unyielding, given how di.cult it might be to amend? 
As we hope we’ve shown, the second question has a good answer, which 
also provides an answer to the +rst. The Eleventh Amendment was indeed 
enacted to eliminate cases like Chisholm, where the disregard of common-law 
immunity threatened both the sovereignty and the solvency of the states. But 
to do this safely and conveniently, the Amendment adopted a principle 
signi+cantly more forceful and uncompromising than the common-law 
principle had been. 
As a result, it made sense to write the Eleventh Amendment narrowly, 
while leaving the common-law rule in place. The restriction on subject-matter 
jurisdiction imposed by the Eleventh Amendment is very di,erent from the 
common-law immunity: it can’t be waived; it can’t be abrogated; it interferes 
with the Supreme Court’s review; and so on. 
There was good reason for the Eleventh Amendment to do these things, 
but its blunt textual force renders it a constitutional sledgehammer. It was 
quite reasonable for the drafters to level that sledgehammer at a smaller class 
of cases, where its full force might sometimes be needed. For this very reason, 
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